This paper uses newly constructed quarterly data back to 1890 to analyze whether multipliers are greater when the unemployment rate is higher. We find no evidence of higher multipliers during periods of slack in the U.S. but we do find some evidence in Canada.
This paper shows that increases in government spending (1) lower private spending; (2) lower unemployment; and (3) raise government employment but not private employment.
This paper argues that anticipations are all-important in assessing the effects of government spending. It also creates a new series consisting of news about future increases in government spending driven by military events.
This paper uses detailed panel data on manufacturing industries to show that increases in government demand raise output and hours, lower real product wages and productivity, and leave
markups unchanged.
This paper makes two main points. First, it argues that increases in government spending during military buildups are very concentrated on a few industries. It then formulates a
two sector model with costly capital mobility showing how the implications of an increase in government spending can change in this richer model. Second, it develops a new
series of "war dates" and uses them to establish stylized facts on the effects of government spending on output, consumption, investment, real wages and interest rates.
This paper describes some preliminary research on a long-term project on differences in education-related time use across ethnic groups.
The Rug Rat Race
with Garey Ramey, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Spring 2010.
This paper documents the dramatic increase in time spent with children, particularly among college-educated parents, since the early 1990s. It tests a variety of hypotheses
and presents a new hypothesis linked to the increased competition to get into college in the U.S.. Comparisons across the U.S. and Canada, where childcare time has not increased much, are consistent with the hypothesis.
This paper argues that the low frequency movements in hours worked per capita are due to sectoral shifts and demographics. It constructs a new series on total hours
worked in the economy as well as versions weighted for demographics. It then shows that when the new series are used in SVARS to identify technology shocks, a positive
technology shock leads to a decrease in hours worked.
A Century of Work and Leisure with Neville Francis, American Economic Journal - Macroeconomics , July 2009. Winner of the "Best Paper Prize" Data
This paper develops new data on time use by demographic group from 1900 to the present. It finds that while leisure time has increased significantly for the elderly, somewhat for the young,
it has not changed much for prime-age individuals.
This paper develops new series on time spent in home production by major groups since 1900. The resulting series are very different from some of the estimates that have
formed the basis of recent macroeconomic papers. It also explores the theoretical and empirical implications of declining relative prices of home appliances.
This paper demonstrates that some of the recent findings of a significant increase in leisure time since 1965 can be traced to subtle variations in the classification
of activities across time diary studies.
This paper compiles new data to investigate the cyclicality of markups. It finds that markups are either procyclical or acyclical, even in response to demand shocks.
This paper argues that the low frequency movements in hours worked per capita are due to sectoral shifts and demographics. It constructs a new series on total hours
worked in the economy as well as versions weighted for demographics. It then shows that when the new series are used in SVARS to identify technology shocks, a positive
technology shock leads to a decrease in hours worked.
This paper develops new over-identifying restrictions to test whether Gali's method of identifying technology shocks makes sense. The findings support his interpretation and results. It then offers two new models that do not involve
sticky prices that can explain the results.
This paper starts by noting that all of the stylized facts about the Great Moderation also characterize the automobile industry. It then estimates a model of production scheduling
in the automobile industry to understand the source of the changes from the viewpoint of that industry in order to shed light on the larger question. It finds that changes
in the persistence of industry demand shocks explain the group of seemingly disparate facts. This change in persistence is consistent with a change in how monetary policy
is conducted.
This paper uses long-run restrictions to decompose shocks into technology and non-technology shocks back to 1889. The paper finds that while positive technology shocks
raised hours in the pre-WWII period, it lowered hours in the post-WWII period. The findings also support Fields' contention that the second half of the 1930s was a period of
great innovation.
This paper argues that growth and business cycles are not necessarily independent phenomenon. Using panel data and instruments, it finds that higher conditional volatility
is associated with lower growth.
(Note: This is the paper we originally submitted to the AER. The first half presents a theory showing how technology commitment and endogenous growth imply a high cost of business cycles. The second half analyzes the relationship between growth and volatility in U.S. time series data. The requested revision, which asked us to eliminate the theory and present cross-country evidence, is the paper published in 1995 under the title "Cross-Country Evidence on the Link between Volatility and Growth.")
This paper questions the previous finding that oil shocks have less effect on the U.S. economy now. Previous studies, including those using Hamilton's measure, have
found that a given size shock to oil or gas prices has less effect on GDP now than in the 1970s. The paper argues that these studies omit the important extra cost imposed by the price controls and
shortages of the 1970s. The paper creates two new measures of oil price shocks that include these costs and finds stability in the response of the
U.S. economy to oil shocks when measured properly. The paper also conducts a detailed analysis of the impact on of oil shocks on the auto industry and finds little change in the
response from the 1970s to the present.
This paper questions the previous finding that oil shocks have less effect on the U.S. economy now. Previous studies, including those using Hamilton's measure, have
found that a given size shock to oil or gas prices has less effect on GDP now than in the 1970s. The paper argues that these studies omit the important extra cost imposed by the price controls and
shortages of the 1970s. The paper creates two new measures of oil price shocks that include these costs and finds stability in the response of the
U.S. economy to oil shocks when measured properly. The paper also conducts a detailed analysis of the impact on of oil shocks on the auto industry and finds little change in the
response from the 1970s to the present.
This paper starts by noting that all of the stylized facts about the Great Moderation also characterize the automobile industry. It then conducts a case study
of the automobile industry to understand the source of the changes from the viewpoint of that industry in order to shed light on the larger question. It finds that changes
in the persistence of industry demand shocks alone explain the group of seemingly disparate facts.
Why Do Computers Depreciate? with Michael Geske and Matthew D. Shapiro Hard to Measure Goods and Services: Essays in Honor of Zvi Griliches , University of Chicago Press, 2007.
This paper uses newly collected data to estimate the loss in value of capital when a plant shuts down in the midst of an industry downsizing. The loss is value of capital
is much greater than the loss in lifetime earnings of the displaced workers.
This paper makes two main points. First, it argues that increases in government spending during military buildups are very concentrated on a few industries. It then formulates a
two sector model with costly capital mobility showing how the implications of an increase in government spending can change in this richer model. Second, it develops a new
series of "war dates" and uses them to establish stylized facts on the effects of government spending on output, consumption, investment, real wages and interest rates.
This paper explores the hypothesis that monetary policy shocks affect the economy through a cost side as well as a demand side. It finds evidence in favor of such a "cost channel."
This paper studies whether credit flows provide information over and above monetary aggregates. For the most part, the answer is "no." The only exceptions are the
credit variables by firm size used by Gertler and Gilchrist.
This paper tests the King-Plosser hypothesis that most movements in money are endogenous responses to an economy hit by technology shocks. The paper constructs a model
that shows that the movements of trade credit across firms can be used to identify whether the movements in money are due to demand or supply. It finds evidence that most
movements are due to money supply shocks, suggesting that monetary policy is driving movements in money.
This paper argues that part of the increase in wage inequality starting in the late 1970s can be linked to increased international competition with U.S. firms that
historically had significant market power. It presents a model in which firms earn rents and share them with their workers. When competition increases, less skilled workers are hurt.
It presents evidence across a panel of cities supporting the implications of the theory.
"The Relationship between Wage Inequality and Trade" with George J. Borjas in The Changing Distribution of Income in an Open U.S. Economy eds. J.H. Bergstrand, T.F. Cosimano, J.W. Houck and R.G. Sheehan, 1994.
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under grant numbers 0617219, 0213089, SBR-9617437, and SES 90-22947. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.