# BEST-WORST SCALING 

Theory, Methods and Applications

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## Chapter 10

# When the ayes don't have it: supplementing an accept/ reject DCE with a Case 2 best-worst scaling task 

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### 10.1 Introduction

Accept/reject and other questions with binary alternatives, such as favor/oppose and like/ dislike, are common in the discrete choice experiment literature. They usually take the form of offering respondents a binary choice, in which the two alternatives are the current status quo and an alternative. There can be a single choice set or a sequence of choice sets. A recent example is the study by Day et al. (2012), who investigated whether consumers would pay an additional charge to have a public water supply that had fewer days with lower-quality taste/smell and color.

A common difficulty with such questions is that a sizable fraction of the population of interest may not shift from choosing one alternative to the other for any plausible difference in attribute values. For example, with a new product, there may be a limited number of people prepared to try it initially, although the larger potential fraction of the population who may buy the product in the longer run might have clear preferences over possible attribute levels that would influence a firm's design decisions. Another common example comes from politics. In places with a well-established two-political-party system, most voters are unlikely to switch their vote from their current party to the other party in the current election cycle. However, this does not mean that voters are indifferent to the candidates/positions of the opposing party. In environmental valuation studies, it is common to see a sizable fraction of the public opposed to an improvement in the status quo level of the environmental good being studied because they ideologically oppose additional government action. What is important to recognize is that, when a consumers are forced to pay for a good or experience a policy change, it cannot be inferred that they are indifferent to specific attribute levels even though they favor or oppose all the alternatives to the current status quo. Common to all these situations is an inability to extract as much information about preferences as researchers ${ }^{7}$ would like, because of constraints on either the range of plausible attribute levels or the rate of adoption/switching in the short run. In situations such as these, a Case 2 best-worst scaling task can be a valuable addition to a binary or multiple choice task.

Table 10.1 Attributes and levels in the voting task

| Attribute | Level |
| :--- | :--- |
| Year in which the scheme begins | Start 2010 |
|  | Start 2012 |
| How the revenues raised are used | Redistribute to poor and seniors |
|  | Reduce GST |
| Invest 20\% of revenues in R\&D | Do not invest in R\&D |
|  | Invest 20 in R\&D |
| Exempt transport-related activities | Do not exempt transport |
|  | Exempt transport |
| Exempt energy-intensive industries | Do not exempt energy |
|  | Exempt energy |

### 10.2 Australian climate policy alternatives

This chapter considers data from a survey involving 388 people randomly sampled from a weighted version of the Pureprofile online panel designed to be representative of voting-age Australians. It is useful to first look at the sequence of binary-choice voting questions, because our implementation of a Case 2 BWS task served as a natural prequel to this more familiar and commonly used voting task. In this case respondents were asked if they would vote for each of 16 emissions trading schemes paired against the status quo of no ETS. Each emissions trading plan was described by a combination of five attributes, each of which has the two possible levels shown in Table 10.1. Since each of the five attributes has two levels, there are $2^{5}$ (32) possible ETSs. We divided the 32 possible schemes into two sets of 16 , each of which had the statistical property that all main effects and two-way interactions for the five attributes can be estimated (under the assumption that all higher-order interactions equal zero).

Graphs of all the main effects and two-way interactions are shown in Figure 10.1. ${ }^{1}$ It is important to note that the ranges on the Y-axis (aggregate sample choice proportions) differ slightly from graph to graph. Nonetheless, a common feature of all graphs is that the range of effects displayed on the Y-axis is relatively small. Mean choice proportions for each of the main effects are shown in Table 10.2 and are consistent with the graphs: they have a narrow range, with only "Start year" and " $20 \%$ in R\&D" displaying a difference in mean choice proportions. In turn, this result suggests the sample respondents were (1) largely indifferent to attributes when voting for schemes, (2) very heterogeneous in their responses to the attributes when voting for the schemes, ${ }^{2}$ or (3) a combination of both.

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Figure 10.1a Attribute main effects: emissions trading schemes

One way to illustrate the narrow range of choice proportions (the percentage voting "Yes" for a particular ETS paired with the status quo) is to calculate the proportion voting "Yes" for each of the 32 possible ETS options in the survey. Table 10.3 sorts the 32 schemes from highest to lowest voting percentage, and shows that 13 of the possible schemes got majority support. We suggest some caution in interpreting these proportions, as 93 people voted "Yes" in every scenario (which makes sense if a respondent is concerned about climate change but does not care a lot about the details of the particular ETS to be implemented).


Figure 10.1b Attribute two-way interactions: emissions trading schemes

One can count the attribute levels for each of the majority-supported schemes to "suggest" what may underlie the choices. For example, all 13 majority schemes were to start in 2010. Six would reduce the Goods and Services Tax, while the rest (seven) would redistribute revenues to poor and senior citizens. Ten of the majority schemes invest 20 percent of revenues in R\&D related to reducing carbon emissions. Seven schemes do not exempt transport-related activities or industries, and nine schemes do not exempt energyintensive industries. This suggests that the sample was most homogeneous about the starting year ( 2010 versus 2012), and was fairly homogeneous towards investing 20 percent in R\&D and not exempting energy-intensive industries. In turn, this suggests that other attributes matter very little and/or a large fraction of respondent are indifferent to differences in them.


Figure 10.1b (cont

Australian climate policy alternatives

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| Energy <br> $-\mathrm{No}$ <br> -Yes |
| :---: |
| Yr2012 |

Table 10.2 Attribute main effect means from the voting task

|  | Mean votes percentage by level |
| :--- | :--- |
| Level | Vote $\%$ |
| Start 2010 | 0.53 |
| Start 2012 | 0.48 |
| Redistribute to poor and seniors | 0.50 |
| Reduce GST | 0.51 |
| Do not invest in R\&D | 0.48 |
| Invest 20\% in R\&D | 0.53 |
| Do not exempt transport | 0.50 |
| Exempt transport | 0.51 |
| Do not exempt energy | 0.51 |
| Exempt energy | 0.49 |
| Total | 0.50 |

Table 10.3 (con.

|  |  |
| :--- | :--- |
|  |  |
| Vote | $1 . \mathrm{Pl}$ <br> begi |
| 0.464 | $\mathrm{Yr2C}$ |
| 0.464 | Yr 2 C |
| 0.459 | $\mathrm{Yr2C}$ |
| 0.454 | Yr 2 C |
| 0.443 | $\mathrm{Yr2C}$ |
| 0.443 | $\mathrm{Yr2C}$ |
| 0.438 | $\mathrm{Yr2C}$ |
| 0.438 | Yr 2 C |
| 0.433 | Yr 2 C |
| 0.412 | Yr 2 C |

Table 10.3 All possible emissions trading schemes sorted by proportion voting "Yes"

| Sorted vote percentage by design matrix |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Vote | 1. Plan begins | 2. Income will go to | 3. Invest 20\% in R\&D | 4. Exempt transport | 5. Exempt energy |
| 0.660 | Yr2010 | Poor/seniors | No | Yes | Yes |
| 0.613 | Yr2010 | Reduce GST | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 0.603 | Yr2010 | Reduce GST | Yes | No | No |
| 0.588 | Yr2012 | Reduce GST | Yes | No | No |
| 0.582 | Yr2010 | Reduce GST | No | Yes | No |
| 0.572 | Yt2010 | Poor/seniors | Yes | Yes | No |
| 0.562 | Yr2010 | Reduce GST | Yes | No | Yes |
| 0.546 | Yr2010 | Poor/seniors | Yes | No | Yes |
| 0.546 | Yr2012 | Poor/seniors | Yes | Yes | No |
| 0.546 | Yr2010 | Poor/seniors | No | No | No |
| 0.531 | Yr2010 | Reduce GST | Yes | Yes | No |
| 0.510 | Yr2010 | Poor/seniors | Yes | No | No |
| 0.505 | Yt2012 | Poor/seniors | Yes | No | Yes |
| 0.490 | Yr2012 | Poor/seniors | Yes | No | No |
| 0.485 | Yr2010 | Reduce GST | No | No | No |
| 0.485 | Yr2010 | Reduce GST | No | No | Yes |
| 0.479 | Yr2012 | Reduce GST | Yes | Yes | No |
| 0.474 | Yr2012 | Poor/seniors | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 0.474 | Yr2012 | Reduce GST | No | No | Yes |
| 0.469 | Yr2012 | Reduce GST | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 0.469 | Yr2010 | Poor/seniors | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 0.464 | Yr2012 | Reduce GST | No | No | No |

Table 10.3 (cont.)

| Sorted vote percentage by design matrix |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Vote | 1. Plan begins | 2. Income will go to | 3. Invest $20 \%$ in R\&D | 4. Exempt transport | 5. Exempt energy |
| 0.464 | Yr2012 | Poor/seniors | No | No | No |
| 0.464 | Yr2012 | Poor/seniors | No | Yes | Yes |
| 0.459 | Yr2012 | Reduce GST | No | Yes | No |
| 0.454 | Yr2010 | Reduce GST | No | Yes | Yes |
| 0.443 | Yr2012 | Poor/seniors | No | Yes | No |
| 0.443 | Yr2012 | Reduce GST | Yes | No | Yes |
| 0.438 | Yr2012 | Reduce GST | No | Yes | Yes |
| 0.438 | Yr2010 | Poor/seniors | No | Yes | No |
| 0.433 | Yr2012 | Poor/seniors | No | No | Yes |
| 0.412 | Yr2010 | Poor/seniors | No | No | Yes |

Table 10.4 Observed numbers of "Yes" votes in the sample

| Total "Yes" votes | Frequency | Percentage in sample |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 0 | 40 | 0.103 |
| 1 | 24 | 0.062 |
| 2 | 20 | 0.052 |
| 3 | 20 | 0.052 |
| 4 | 24 | 0.062 |
| 5 | 30 | 0.077 |
| 6 | 17 | 0.044 |
| 7 | 19 | 0.049 |
| 8 | 21 | 0.054 |
| 9 | 14 | 0.036 |
| 10 | 17 | 0.044 |
| 11 | 11 | 0.028 |
| 12 | 18 | 0.046 |
| 13 | 9 | 0.023 |
| 14 | 17 | 0.044 |
| 15 | 29 | 0.075 |
| 16 | 58 | 0.149 |

We next consider the total number of "Yes" votes for the sample displayed in Table 10.4, which shows that about 25 percent of the sample always voted "No" or always voted "Yes," providing no preference information for attributes/levels. A further 24 percent voted "No" or "Yes" almost every time, again giving little attribute/level preference information. Thus,
almost 50 percent of the sample in the voting task responded extremely, providing little information about how the sample is likely to respond to changes in attribute levels; however, schemes that will attract majority support (a majority "Yes" vote) can clearly be identified. This suggests that some (perhaps many) of the 49 percent with extreme responses were using accept/reject rules that are not well approximated by additive indirect utility functions, and, indeed, some (perhaps many) may have behaved deterministically.

### 10.3 Case 2 best-worst scaling task

We combined the binary-choice voting task with a Case 2 best-worst scaling task, such that each of the 388 survey respondents reported the attribute levels that they thought were, respectively, the best and worst aspects of each scheme described. An example of this task is depicted in Figure 10.2, which shows that survey respondents were asked to tick one box for the best and a second box for the worst attribute level. Each respondent completed this task in conjunction with the accept/reject task - that is, we showed respondents one emissions trading scheme description at a time, and they were asked to choose the best and worst aspects of each scheme description and then tell us whether they would vote "Yes" or "No" for it. Thus, despite the fact that many respondents made extreme choices in the voting task, they each provided a complete set of Case 2 BWS choices. This allows us to analyze the choice data for the aggregate sample and each person.

We begin with the attribute level choices for the aggregate sample. Table 10.5 contains the mean best and worst choice sample proportions and their associated standard deviations. These results suggest that there may be more to the voting preferences than meets the eye. Specifically, we can immediately "see" large differences in best and worst choice proportions for levels of start year, redistribution of revenues and investing in R\&D. By way of contrast, exemptions for transport and energy show much smaller differences.

Marley, Flynn and Louviere (2008) showed that the best and worst choices in Case 2 BWS tasks can be placed on a common scale (see Chapter 3). Thus, we can use the results in Table 10.5 to calculate additional sample measures, such as (1) best-minus-worst choice proportion differences, (2) the square root of best divided by worst choice proportions and (3) the natural logarithm of the square root of best divided by worst choice proportions. The first measure is a difference scale of the latent "bestness" of a level centered at zero. Ratios

| The best aspect of this <br> plan is (tick one box <br> below): | Aspects of plan 1 | The worst aspect of this <br> plan is (tick one box <br> below): |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\square$ | Start plan in 2012 | $\square$ |
| $\square$ | Use revenues to reduce GST | $\square$ |
| $\square$ | Do not invest 20\% in R\&D | $\square$ |
| $\square$ | Exempt transport | $\square$ |
| $\square$ | Exempt energy | $\square$ |

Figure 10.2 Example Case 2 BWS task for emissions trading scheme options

Table 10.5 Agg
Level
Start 2010
Start 2012
Redistribute to pc Reduce GST
Do not invest in I Invest $20 \%$ in R8 Do not exempt tr: Exempt transport Do not exempt er Exempt energy

Table 10.6 Calc

## Level

Start 2010
Start 2012
Redistribute to po seniors
Reduce GST
Do not invest in R Invest 20\% in R\& Do not exempt tra Exempt transport Do not exempt enr Exempt energy
of differences ari be directly com] proportional to $t$ compare differe: measures (for ex difference scale, difference scores proportions; as si between zero ans proportions (for । The calculatic graphically disp!
, providing little attribute levels; rote) can clearly nt with extreme additive indirect terministically.
ig task, such that y thought were, mple of this task d to tick one box it completed this respondents one choose the best they would vote treme choices in This allows us to
le 10.5 contains standard deviaes than meets the ad worst choice ing in R\&D. By differences. 1oices in Case 2 use the results in ius-worst choice proportions and proportions. The dat zero. Ratios

Table 10.5 Aggregate sample mean best-worst choices by attribute level

| Level | Best mean \% | Worst mean \% | Best SD | Worst SD |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Start 2010 | 0.33 | 0.17 | 0.471 | 0.377 |
| Start 2012 | 0.14 | 0.36 | 0.349 | 0.479 |
| Redistribute to poor and seniors | 0.38 | 0.17 | 0.486 | 0.376 |
| Reduce GST | 0.43 | 0.09 | 0.496 | 0.291 |
| Do not invest in R\&D | 0.07 | 0.25 | 0.249 | 0.434 |
| Invest 20\% in R\&D | 0.23 | 0.10 | 0.421 | 0.305 |
| Do not exempt transport | 0.09 | 0.22 | 0.293 | 0.416 |
| Exempt transport | 0.12 | 0.23 | 0.321 | 0.423 |
| Do not exempt energy | 0.09 | 0.20 | 0.280 | 0.398 |
| Exempt energy | 0.12 | 0.20 | 0.323 | 0.401 |

Table 10.6 Calculation of best and worst measures from Table 5 results

|  | Best <br> mean \% | Worst <br> mean \% | $\mathrm{B} \%-\mathrm{W} \%$ | SQRT <br> $(\mathrm{B} \% / \mathrm{W} \%)$ | $\mathrm{Ln}(\mathrm{SQRT}$ <br> $(\mathrm{B} \% / \mathrm{W} \%)$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | ---: | :--- | ---: |
| Level | 0.330 | 0.170 | 0.160 | 1.393 | 0.332 |
| Start 2010 | 0.140 | 0.360 | -0.220 | 0.624 | -0.472 |
| Start 2012 | 0.380 | 0.170 | 0.210 | 1.495 | 0.402 |
| Redistribute to poor and |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\quad$ seniors | 0.430 | 0.090 | 0.340 | 2.186 | 0.782 |
| Reduce GST | 0.070 | 0.250 | -0.180 | 0.529 | -0.636 |
| Do not invest in R\&D | 0.230 | 0.100 | 0.130 | 1.517 | 0.416 |
| Invest 20\% in R\&D | 0.090 | 0.220 | -0.130 | 0.640 | -0.447 |
| Do not exempt transport | 0.120 | 0.230 | -0.110 | 0.722 | -0.325 |
| Exempt transport | 0.090 | 0.200 | -0.110 | 0.671 | -0.399 |
| Do not exempt energy | 0.120 | 0.200 | -0.080 | 0.775 | -0.255 |

of differences are meaningful quantities on this scale, but differences between levels cannot be directly compared. The second measure is a ratio scale of "bestness" that should be proportional to the best choice proportions, which we test below. This scale allows one to compare differences between levels and make meaningful statements about ratios of measures (for example, this level is twice as "best" as that level). Measure three also is a difference scale centered around zero, and should be proportional to the best-minus-worst difference scores, which we also test below. Finally, the measures in Table 10.5 are choice proportions; as such, they are estimates of choice probabilities on an absolute scale ranging between zero and one, allowing one to make meaningful statements about ratios of choice proportions (for example, level A is half as likely to be chosen best as level B).

The calculations are given in Table 10.6, with relationships between the measures graphically displayed in Figures 10.3a, 10.3b and 10.3c. The figures indicate that the


Figure 10.3 Relationships between calculated BWS measures for aggregate sample
assumption that : worst proportion best proportions 1 of best proportior ratio of best prof proportionality 0 between best and attribute levels $\dot{c}$ variability) in $b \in$ making best and

We consider c totals for each att us to test differer least partially res worst proportion: reveal potentially choices. Work bj (2010) suggests t best and worst ch there is no struct there is structure. see where cluster to four clusters, Table 10.7 conta respondents in or respondents.

The columns i Each of the three best-minus-wors sample averages: other words, it is choices). Thus, t consistency, or 1 distribution. We principal compos underlies each se clusters).

The results o Table 10.8a prov with the first com looks at the same It seems clear th
assumption that aggregate-sample best choice proportions are inversely related to their worst proportion counterparts is not well satisfied. However, the relationships between (a) best proportions minus worst proportions and the natural log of the square root of the ratio of best proportions to worst proportions and (b) best proportions and the square root of the ratio of best proportions divided by worst proportions better satisfy the assumption of proportionality of measures. Possible reasons for the unsatisfactory fit of the relationship between best and worst proportions are (1) preference heterogeneity (that is, the choices of attribute levels differ across respondents), (2) differences in choice consistency (error variability) in best and worst choices and/or (3) different rules (choice processes) for making best and worst choices.

We consider choice (preference) heterogeneity by calculating best and worst choice totals for each attribute level for each person and then cluster-analyzing them. This allows us to test differences in best and worst choices of attribute levels to determine if this is at least partially responsible for the poor fit of the assumed relationship between best and worst proportions. Additionally, the cluster analysis is interesting in its own right, as it can reveal potentially meaningful differences in respondents that can shed light on the voting choices. Work by Dimitriadou, Dolničar and Weingessel (2002) and Dolničar and Leisch (2010) suggests that, if there is structure underlying the data of interest (here, the individual best and worst choices), all cluster procedures will find it; however, they also showed that, if there is no structure underlying the data, many methods will give results suggesting that there is structure. We use Ward's hierarchical tree clustering approach, as this allows us to see where clusters form and how they agglomerate and separate (that is, if we go from three to four clusters, we know exactly where the people who become cluster four come from). Table 10.7 contains the aggregate summary results of a six-cluster solution for the 388 respondents in our sample; we stopped at six clusters because additional clusters had few respondents.

The columns in Tables 10.7 a to 10.7 c are labeled C 1 to C6, representing the six clusters. Each of the three tables ( $a$ to $c$ ) has a different measure; for example, Table 10.7 a displays best-minus-worst difference scores. We graphed (not shown here) clusters 1 to 6 against the sample averages, which strongly suggested that the cluster differences were not large (in other words, it is likely that there is no real multi-modal structure underlying the best-worst choices). Thus, the sample is very homogeneous but displays large variability in the choice consistency, or the sample differences can be represented by some type of probability distribution. We begin by testing cluster differences in a simple but compelling way with principal components analysis. The null hypothesis of interest is that only one component underlies each set of measures, and the collection of all 18 measures ( 3 BWS measures $\times 6$ clusters).

The results of this analysis suggest that only one component underlies the data. Table 10.8a provides a singular value decomposition in terms of the three measures used with the first component in all cases explaining over 90 percent of the variance. Table 10.8 b looks at the same type of analysis but now using all three measures in Table 10.8a together. It seems clear that there is no underlying structure beyond one component.

Table 10.7 Calculations derived from the most and least Case 2 BWS choices
a Best-minus-worst difference scores

| Means Alt | Best-minus-worst difference scores |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | C1 | C2 | C3 | C4 | C5 | C6 |
| Start 2010 | 0.140 | 0.077 | 0.213 | 0.175 | 0.136 | 0.183 |
| Start 2012 | -. 0.123 | -0.304 | -0.163 | -0.295 | -0.216 | -0.169 |
| Poor and seniors | 0.213 | 0.240 | 0.098 | 0.267 | 0.245 | 0.187 |
| Reduce GST | $0.360^{\circ}$ | 0.369 | 0.321 | 0.295 | 0.436 | 0.277 |
| Not invest R\&D | -0.211 | -0.115 | -0.213 | -0.183 | -0.219 | -0.144 |
| Invest R\&D | 0.113 | 0.093 | 0.187 | 0.089 | 0.139 | 0.135 |
| Not exempt transport | -0.076 | -0.163 | -0.175 | -0.094 | -0.102 | -0.179 |
| Exempt transport | -0.221 | $-0.064$ | -0.075 | -0.099 | -0.175 | -0.063 |
| Not exempt energy | -0.032 | -0.125 | -0.138 | -0.065 | -0.120 | -0.194 |
| Exempt energy | -0.164 | -0.006 | -0.054 | -0.089 | -0.125 | -0.031 |

b Square root of best choices (counts) divided by worst choices (counts)

| Means | SQRT(best/worst) |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Alt | C 1 | C 2 | C 3 | C 4 | C 5 | C 6 |
| Start 2010 | 1.316 | 1.165 | 1.688 | 1.414 | 1.358 | 1.396 |
| Start 2012 | 0.777 | 0.529 | 0.661 | 0.545 | 0.593 | 0.724 |
| Poor and seniors | 1.607 | 1.572 | 1.189 | 1.792 | 1.550 | 1.400 |
| Reduce GST | 2.184 | 2.143 | 2.116 | 2.100 | 2.483 | 1.902 |
| Not invest R\&D | 0.521 | 0.661 | 0.495 | 0.554 | 0.383 | 0.528 |
| Invest R\&D | 1.367 | 1.300 | 1.693 | 1.323 | 1.647 | 1.672 |
| Not exempt transport | 0.776 | 0.540 | 0.553 | 0.750 | 0.699 | 0.544 |
| Exempt transport | 0.512 | 0.816 | 0.813 | 0.744 | 0.591 | 0.816 |
| Not exempt energy | 0.876 | 0.539 | 0.616 | 0.793 | 0.642 | 0.485 |
| Exempt energy | 0.514 | 0.979 | 0.843 | 0.744 | 0.688 | 0.910 |

c Natural log of the square root quantities in Table $4 b$

| Means | $\operatorname{Ln}[S Q R T$ (best/worst)] |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Alt | C 1 | C 2 | C 3 | C 4 | C 5 | C 6 |
| Start 2010 | 0.274 | 0.153 | 0.524 | 0.347 | 0.306 | 0.334 |
| Start 2012 | -0.253 | -0.636 | -0.414 | -0.607 | -0.522 | -0.323 |
| Poor and seniors | 0.474 | 0.452 | 0.173 | 0.583 | 0.438 | 0.337 |
| Reduce GST | 0.781 | 0.762 | 0.750 | 0.742 | 0.910 | 0.643 |
| Not invest R\&D | -0.652 | -0.413 | -0.703 | -0.591 | -0.961 | -0.639 |
| Invest R\&D | 0.312 | 0.263 | 0.526 | 0.280 | 0.499 | 0.514 |
| Not exempt transport | -0.253 | -0.616 | -0.593 | -0.287 | -0.359 | -0.610 |
| Exempt transport | -0.669 | -0.203 | -0.207 | -0.295 | -0.527 | -0.203 |
| Not exempt energy | -0.132 | -0.617 | -0.485 | -0.232 | -0.443 | -0.724 |
| Exempt energy | -0.666 | -0.021 | -0.170 | -0.296 | -0.374 | -0.094 |

Case 2 best-worst scaling task
Table 10.8a Singular value decomposition results for measures (principal components analysis)

| Component | Best-worst differences |  | SQRT(best/worst) |  | Ln[SQRT(best/worst)] |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Eigenvalue | \% of variance | Eigenvalue | \% of variance | Eigenvalue | \% of variance |
| 1 | 5.581 | 93.013 | 5.629 | 93.817 | 5.444 | 90.738 |
| 2 | 0.202 | 3.368 | 0.207 | 3.442 | 0.360 | 5.997 |
| 3 | 0.151 | 2.514 | 0.108 | 1.807 | 0.127 | 2.109 |
| 4 | 0.041 | 0.681 | 0.029 | 0.475 | 0.039 | 0.653 |
| 5 | 0.022 | 0.362 | 0.022 | 0.360 | 0.020 | 0.335 |
| 6 | 0.004 | 0.061 | 0.006 | 0.099 | 0.010 | 0.168 |

Table 10.8 b Principal components analysis results for all three measures

|  | Analysis combining all three measures |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Component | Eigenvalue | \% of variance |
| 1 | 16.486 | 91.588 |
| 2 | 0.737 | 4.092 |
| 3 | 0.456 | 2.534 |
| 4 | 0.170 | 0.947 |
| 5 | 0.081 | 0.448 |
| 6 | 0.043 | 0.240 |
| 7 | 0.011 | 0.062 |
| 8 | 0.008 | 0.046 |
| 9 | 0.007 | 0.041 |
| 10 to $18=0$ |  |  |

We now produce histograms for the 10 attribute levels for the best-minus-worst difference scores; the PCA results indicate that results are the same for all measures, so we discuss only the BWS scores. Histograms are calculated for the entire data set, which is why there are so many observations ( 80 observations $\times 388$ people), but the graph would be identical for one observation per person. In Figure 10.4, look at the first row of the figure that has the two start date attribute levels, 2010 and 2012. The average difference scores for 2012 are lower than those for 2010 . The data also are multi-modal, with spikes at -1 and +1 , but the mass of the distribution is concentrated near zero, suggesting that many people were indifferent about start year. In the case of how to use the revenues collected by the scheme, many people chose to give the revenues to the poor and seniors every time that choice was available ( +1 ), although on average the mean for reducing the GST is higher. So, there seem to be many individual differences as well as a lot of indifference (mass again centered near zero). For investing in research and development, the sample clearly favors investing 20


Figure 10.4 Histograms for BWS scores for each attribute level

Figure 10.4 (cont.

Case 2 best-worst scaling task

$\begin{array}{lll}.00 & 1.000 & 1.500\end{array}$






Figure 10.4 (cont.)


Figure 10.4 (cont.)

$00 \quad 1.000 \quad 1.200$

$30 \quad 1.000 \quad 1.200$



Figure 10.4 (cont.)
percent of the revenues raised in $R \& D$, with a clear mode at +1 for the latter level, together with a large proportion of indifferent people. Both transport exemption levels were relatively unpopular (both have negative means), and only a few people chose either level consistently as best or worst, with many indifferent to both levels. Both energy attribute levels also have negative means, but a few people consistently chose them as the worst levels ( -1 ), with many indifferent (near zero).

We also investigate the degree to which respondents were consistent in their choices by fitting linear probability models to each person's best and worst choices, and calculating the residuals from these regressions for each person. We then square the residuals and display their distribution in a histogram in Figures 10.5 a and 10.5 b , which are, respectively, the


Figure 10.5(a) Residuals squared for worst


Figure 10.5(b) Residuals squared for best
mean squared residuals for best and worst choices. These histograms suggest that the vast majority of people were very consistent in their choices, and that they were slightly more consistent in making best choices than worst choices. Taken together, the histograms suggest that many people were deterministic or nearly so in their best and worst choices of attribute levels. The histograms also indicate that it would be difficult to tell a wellbehaved random coefficient story for this sample. In other words, although one can estimate statistical choice models from these data that allow for a distribution of utility estimates over the respondents, it is unclear (1) why one would want to do that in this case and (2) whether such a statistical representation would be stable over space and time in any meaningful way.

### 10.4 Relationship to covariates

Therefore, it is likely that a more insightful approach is to determine if one can capture "observable" (as opposed to "unobservable") preference heterogeneity in the sample by allowing choices of attribute levels for the two tasks to differ by particular covariate measures in the survey, as we now show.

We begin by calculating simple best-minus-worst difference scores. We use the 1,0 choice indicator measures in the data to construct a new variable that takes on the values -1 (level chosen worst), 0 (level not chosen as either best or worst) and +1 (level chosen best). Ultimately, we wish to ask if we can predict these three outcomes statistically using available covariates as predictors. Two obvious statistical models that can be used for this purpose are (1) unconditional (polychotomous) multinomial logit regression and (2) ordinal regression. We do not illustrate using these statistical models to test for relationships with the covariates because the number of possible terms is too large.

In any case, before fitting models one should "look" at one's data, which we do by crosstabbing the best-minus-worst difference scores with the covariates. We examine these results and the associated chi-square tests. There are many cross-tab tables for this data set, so, in the interests of space and because this is a case study chapter, we present only a few results (tables). Specifically, we cross-tab the BWS difference scores with available covariate measures, for each attribute level. We now discuss a few of the more interesting results.

We categorize the tables by the attribute level to which they pertain. For example, the first set of three tables relates to the attribute level "Starting the scheme in 2010." Table 10.9a indicates that respondents who agreed that global warming probably has been happening were much more likely to choose that level as most $(+1)$, while those who disagreed were more likely to choose it as least ( -1 ). Table 10.9 b looks at political parties, and shows that Greens were more likely to choose 2010 as most ( +1 ) and Liberals were most likely to choose it as least $(-1) .^{3}$ So, more left-leaning voters favored starting in 2010, but more right-leaning voters favored starting in 2012.

[^1]Table 10.9 Cross-tab plans that start in 2010
a Start in 2010

|  |  | BWS |  |  | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | -1 | 0 | +1 |  |
| Do you think global warming probably has been happening, or it probably hasn't been happening? | Has been | 14.8\% | 49.5\% | 35.6\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Has not been | 29.3\% | 51.0\% | 19.7\% | 100.0\% |
| Total |  | 17.1\% | 49.8\% | 33.1\% | 100.0\% |

Notes: Pearson chi-square $=82.142 ; \mathrm{df}=2 ; \mathrm{Sig}<0.000$.
b Start in 2010

|  |  | BWS |  |  | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | -1 | 0 | +1 |  |
| Which political party do you identify the most with: | Labour | 16.6\% | 47.1\% | 36.3\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Liberals | 23.1\% | 52.6\% | 24.4\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Greens | 6.3\% | 52.4\% | 41.3\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Nationals | 15.0\% | 55.0\% | 30.0\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Democrats | 14.6\% | 45.8\% | 39.6\% | 100.0\% |
|  | None | 17.4\% | 50.9\% | 31.7\% | 100.0\% |
| Total |  | 17.1\% | 49.8\% | 33.1\% | 100.0\% |

Notes: Pearson chi-square $=62.439 ; \mathrm{df}=10 ; \mathrm{Sig}<0.000$.

The next tables relate to giving part of the revenues raised to help the poor and senior citizens. Table 10.10a tabulates BWS scores with age, which indicates that the older the respondent, the more likely he/she was to choose this level as most, while at the same time being less likely to choose it as least. Table 10.10 b tabulates household income with the BWS scores, suggesting that the higher the household income, the less likely a respondent was to choose this level as most ( +1 ), and instead he/she is more likely to choose it as least $(-1)$. Conversely, poorer respondents were more likely to choose it as most ( +1 ).

The next results refer to using the revenues to reduce the GST. Table 10.11a tabulates those agreeing with implementing a scheme that reduces more emissions even if it costs more. Respondents who disagreed were much more likely to choose this level as most $(+1)$. Table 10.11 b tabulates political affiliation with the level, showing that those most likely to choose reducing GST (+1) had no political affiliation, those least likely to choose reducing GST as most were the Greens, while the Nationals were least likely to choose reducing GST as least ( -1 ).

The next set of tables give results for investing 20 percent of the revenues in research and development related to reducing emissions and sustainable technologies. Table 10.12a looks at how serious respondents think global warming will be for Australia's future

Table 10.10 Cross-tab giving the revenues to the poor and senior citizens
a Giving revenues to poor and seniors

|  |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| +1 | Total |
| $35.6 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
| $19.7 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
| $33.1 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| +1 | Total |
| $36.3 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
| $24.4 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
| $41.3 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
| $30.0 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
| $39.6 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
| $31.7 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
| $33.1 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |

oor and senior t the older the : the same time come with the y a respondent coose it as least $(+1)$
J.11a tabulates even if it costs $2 l$ as most $(+1)$. > most likely to coose reducing : reducing GST in research and Table 10.12a stralia's future


Notes: Pearson chi-square $=169.371 ; \mathrm{df}=22 ; \mathrm{Sig}<0.000$.
b Giving revenues to poor and seniors

|  |  |  | BWS |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  |  | -1 | 0 | +1 |  |
|  |  | Total |  |  |  |
| Household income | Below $\$ 25,000$ | $5.7 \%$ | $29.8 \%$ | $64.6 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  | $\$ 25,000$ to $\$ 50,000$ | $9.1 \%$ | $47.2 \%$ | $43.7 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  | $\$ 50,000$ to $\$ 75,000$ | $13.3 \%$ | $41.2 \%$ | $45.5 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  | $\$ 75,000$ to $\$ 100,000$ | $23.4 \%$ | $46.6 \%$ | $30.0 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  | $\$ 100,000$ to $\$ 125,000$ | $24.6 \%$ | $45.3 \%$ | $30.1 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  | $\$ 125,000$ to $\$ 150,000$ | $20.1 \%$ | $56.4 \%$ | $23.5 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  | $\$ 150,000$ to $\$ 200,000$ | $26.6 \%$ | $54.9 \%$ | $18.5 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  | Above $\$ 200,000$ | $20.3 \%$ | $47.7 \%$ | $32.0 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  |  | $17.0 \%$ | $44.9 \%$ | $38.1 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |

Notes: Pearson chi-square $=252.268 ; \mathrm{df}=14 ; \operatorname{Sig}<0.000$.
crossed with investing in R\&D. It indicates that the more serious respondents think the problem will be, the more they are likely to choose this level as most (1), whereas the less serious respondents thought it was, the more likely the level chosen was least ( -1 ). Table 10.12 b looks at attitudes towards technological breakthroughs fixing global warming with choice of the level as most or least, and shows that the more faith is expressed in technological advances solving the problems, the more likely investing in R\&D is chosen as

Table 10.11 Cross-tab using the revenues to reduce the GST
a Using revenues to reduce the GST


Notes: Pearson chi-square $=51.984 ; \mathrm{df}=2 ; \operatorname{Sig}<0.000$.
b Using revenues to reduce the GST


Notes: Pearson chi-square $=105.436 ; \mathrm{df}=10 ; \mathrm{Sig}<0.000$.
most $(+1)$. Conversely, the less faith is expressed, the more likely it is chosen as least $(-1)$. Table 10.12 c shows that professionals were most likely to choose the level as most (1), while production and transport workers were least likely to choose it as most (1). Laborers and related workers were most likely to choose the level as least ( -1 ). Finally, Table 12d shows that Greens were most likely to choose this level as most ( +1 ), whereas Nationals were more likely to choose it as least ( -1 ).

The final set of tables pertains to exempting energy-intensive industries. Table 10.13a tabulates where respondents live in connection with this question. Respondents in Brisbane and Perth were most likely to choose this level as most $(+1)$, while respondents in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Tasmania were least likely to choose it as most (+1). Conversely, respondents in South Australia other than in Adelaide and respondents in the Northern Territory were most likely to choose the -1 level, while Brisbane respondents were least likely to choose the -1 level. Table 10.13 b shows that respondents affiliated with Greens and Democrats were least likely to choose this level as most (1). Nationals were

Table 10.12 Cross-tab investing 20 percent of the revenues in $R \& D$
a Investing 20 percent of revenues in $R \& D$

|  |  | BWS |  |  | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | -1 | 0 | +1 |  |
| If nothing is done to reduce global warming in the future, how serious a problem do you think it will be for Australia? | Extremely serious | 7.5\% | 64.2\% | 28.3\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Very serious | 10.4\% | 64.8\% | 24.8\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Somewhat serious | 11.6\% | 73.1\% | 15.2\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Slightly serious | 14.7\% | 66.5\% | 18.8\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Not serious at all | 18.1\% | 69.0\% | 13.0\% | 100.0\% |
| Total |  | 10.4\% | 66.6\% | 23.1\% | 100.0\% |

Notes: Pearson chi-square $=74.010 ; \mathrm{df}=8 ; \mathrm{Sig}<0.000$.
b Investing 20 percent of revenues in $R \& D$

|  |  | BWS |  |  | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | -1 | 0 | +1 |  |
| How much faith do you have that technological breakthroughs will solve major environmental problems in the future? | A lot | 9.7\% | 55.2\% | 35.0\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Some | 9.8\% | 69.2\% | 21.0\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Little | 11.7\% | 69.5\% | 18.8\% | 100.0\% |
|  | None | 14.6\% | 74.3\% | 11.1\% | 100.0\% |
| Total |  | 10.4\% | 66.6\% | 23.1\% | 100.0\% |

Notes: Pearson chi-square $=77.503 ; \mathrm{df}=6 ; \mathrm{Sig}<0.000$.
c Investing 20 percent of revenues in $R \& D$

|  |  | BWS |  |  | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | -1 | 0 | +1 |  |
| Which of the following best describes your current occupation? | Manager or administrator | 11.2\% | 55.4\% | 33.5\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Small business owner/partner | 10.4\% | 62.1\% | 27.5\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Professional (e.g. doctor, architect, solicitor, etc.) | 7.7\% | 55.3\% | 37.0\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Associate professional (e.g. police, nurse, technician) | 10.7\% | 73.2\% | 16.1\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Tradesperson or related worker | 11.0\% | 71.3\% | 17.6\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Clerical, sales and ${ }^{\text {s }}$ ervice worker | 12.3\% | 66.7\% | 21.1\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Production and transport worker | 6.3\% | 85.4\% | 8.3\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Laborer or related worker | 15.6\% | 69.5\% | 14.8\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Other | 9.8\% | 73.7\% | 16.5\% | 100.0\% |
| Total |  | 10.4\% | 66.6\% | 23.1\% | 100.0\% |

d Investing 20 percent of revenues in $R \& D$

|  |  | BWS |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  |  | -1 |  |  |  |
|  |  | 0 | 1 | Total |  |
| Which political party do you | Labor | $11.3 \%$ | $67.2 \%$ | $21.4 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
| identify the most with? | Liberals | $8.3 \%$ | $67.9 \%$ | $23.7 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  | Greens | $7.3 \%$ | $49.3 \%$ | $43.4 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  | Nationals | $32.5 \%$ | $50.0 \%$ | $17.5 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  | Democrats | $4.2 \%$ | $56.3 \%$ | $39.6 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  | None | $10.8 \%$ | $71.9 \%$ | $17.3 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |
|  |  | $10.4 \%$ | $66.6 \%$ | $23.1 \%$ | $100.0 \%$ |

Notes: Pearson chi-square $=117.501 ; \mathrm{df}=10 ; \mathrm{Sig}<0.000$.
most likely to choose it as most (1). Democrats and Greens were most likely to choose this level as least ( -1 ), and Nationals were least likely to choose it as least $(-1)$.

One might well ask why one rarely sees tests of unobservable heterogeneity that extend beyond a few covariates. The answer is that (1) there is little to no theory to guide hypothesis testing and model selection, and (2) there typically are many possible effects that could be estimated. For example, if you consider only the tables above, there are several binary attitudinal measures (two categories), political party (six), age (nine), location (13), occupation (nine), two questions about how much faith one has in technological solutions to climate change (four) and how serious global warming might be (five), and household income (eight), to name only the ones illustrated. There are 10 attribute levels that could be chosen as most or least or not chosen as either (three). Thus, if we want to test the covariates mentioned against whether or not each attribute level is chosen as most or least, there are three response outcomes $(-1,0,+1) \times 10$ attribute levels $\times$ (several 2 s ), $\times 6 \times 9 \times 13 \times 9 \times 4$ $\times 5 \times 8$, or $242,611,200$ possible cells that could be observed if we fully cross all the measures. Typically, one considers only the main effects; hence, there are (two nonreferenced outcome categories $\times 10$ levels $) \times(3+5+8+12+8+3+4+7)=20 \times 50$ $=1,000$. Each covariate main effect has degrees of freedom equal to the number of categories minus one, so the total covariate's main effects are the additive component of the expression. They are estimated for each attribute level and two of the response outcome categories. We, in fact, estimated an unconditional (polychotomous) multinomial logit model for each level. Appendix 10.A contains statistical estimation results for giving the revenues to the poor and senior citizens and using the revenues to reduce the GST. The size and complexity of these tables should make it obvious why we do not report results for the other eight levels or attempt to interpret the results here but, instead, leave it to those who may be interested to peruse.

Table 10.13 C

In which locatio

Total
Notes: Pearson
b Exempting $e$

Which political

Total
Notes: Pearson ©

The purpose of best-worst task based on a stu more traditions to vote for a pa

Table 10.13 Crosstab exempting energy-intensive industries
a Exempting energy-intensive industries

|  |  | BWS |  |  | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | -1 | 0 | +1 |  |
| In which location do you live? | Sydney | 19.6\% | 68.1\% | 12.3\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Other NSW | 15.8\% | 70.7\% | 13.5\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Melbourne | 24.2\% | 64.6\% | 11.2\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Other Victoria | 16.9\% | 70.0\% | 13.1\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Brisbane | 8.6\% | 71.9\% | 19.5\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Other Queensland | 19.3\% | 72.4\% | 8.3\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Adelaide | 21.6\% | 68.5\% | 9.9\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Other South Australia | 33.0\% | 59.1\% | 8.0\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Perth | 15.8\% | 68.2\% | 16.1\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Other WA | 25.0\% | 67.9\% | 7.1\% | 100.0\% |
|  | ACT | 30.1\% | 67.0\% | 2.8\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Tasmania | 22.1\% | 70.2\% | 7.7\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Northern Territory | 41.7\% | 41.7\% | 16.7\% | 100.0\% |
| Total |  | 20.1\% | 68.1\% | 11:8\% | 100.0\% |

Notes: Pearson chi-square $=96.795 ; \mathrm{df}=24 ; \mathrm{Sig}<0.000$.
b Exempting energy-intensive industries

|  |  | BWS |  |  | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | -1 | 0 | +1 |  |
| Which political party do you identify the most with? | Labor | 19.0\% | 70.3\% | 10.7\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Liberals | 15.7\% | 68.3\% | 16.0\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Greens | 38.9\% | 53.5\% | 7.6\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Nationals | 20.0\% | 55.0\% | 25.0\% | 100.0\% |
|  | Democrats | 45.8\% | 52.1\% | 2.1\% | 100.0\% |
|  | None | 16.9\% | 71.3\% | 11.8\% | 100.0\% |
| Total |  | 20.1\% | 68.1\% | 11.8\% | 100.0\% |

Notes: Pearson chi-square $=116.025 ; \mathrm{df}=10 ; \operatorname{Sig}<0.000$.

### 10.5 Discussion and concluding remarks

The purpose of this chapter was to provide a case study comparison of Case 2 and Case 3 best-worst tasks. We focused on a comparison of emissions trading schemes in Australia based on a study of a random sample of voting-age Australians in 2009. We compared a more traditional DCE (Case 3) format whereby survey respondents decided whether or not to vote for a particular ETS described by five 2-level attributes with a Case 2 task in which
they chose, respectively, the best and worst attribute levels in each ETS profile (description, treatment combination). We noted that Cases 2 and 3 are complementary in so far as they provide different measures and insights into the values of attribute levels. For example, Case 2 places each of the 10 attribute levels on a common scale, whereas Case 3 measures each attribute level on separate scales for each attribute. In fact, the latter property of Case 3 measures is a key reason that economists developed Hicksian welfare measures such as willingness to pay; it puts these quantities on a common scale (such as dollars), allowing attribute-level comparisons with a common numeraire.

We showed that the Case 3 aggregate sample results actually had large underlying differences in respondents on some attributes/levels, such as start year and distribution of revenues. There also were many people who always voted "No" or "Yes"- a common result in binary discrete choice DCE tasks. We also showed that there were common attribute levels associated with the sample of emissions trading schemes that received more than 50 percent "Yes" votes, such that all had a starting year of 2010, a majority had an investment of 20 percent of revenues raised in $\mathrm{R} \& D$ activities and a majority did not exempt energyintensive industries. We compared these results to the Case 2 BWS results, which showed non-continuous, multi-modal distributions of choices on most attributes. We also showed that we could identify statistical differences in the choices made in the Case 2 task that were related to individual covariate differences such as age, gender and income. Thus, the Case 2 results provided more nuanced, complementary insights into the distribution of choices and their relationship with observable individual differences measured by the covariates.

## Appendix 10.A MNL estimation of least and most choice for two attribute levels

Table 10.A1 Listing and description of covariates used in analyses

| Covariates and associated levels used in the MNL estimation | N |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | -1 | 527 |
| BWS | 0 | 1395 |
|  | 1 | 1182 |
| Q1. Which of the three ways is the one that you most | Taxes | 760 |
| prefer the government to use to reduce greenhouse gas | Permits | 744 |
| emissions? | Technical standards | 1600 |
|  | Internet | 896 |
|  | Magazines | 112 |
| Q10. From what source do you get most of your infor- | Meetings | Newspapers |
| mation about global warming? | Radio | 80 |
|  | Television | 520 |
|  | Other | 80 |
|  |  | 1008 |
|  | 408 |  |

ile (description, n so far as they :. For example, 'ase 3 measures uperty of Case 3 zasures such as llars), allowing rge underlying I distribution of common result mmon attribute d more than 50 1 an investment exempt energy. which showed Ve also showed 2 task that were .hus, the Case 2 1 of choices and :ovariates.

## ribute levels



Table 10.A1 (cont.)


Table 10.A1 (cont.)


Table 10.A2 $S$ (poor and senic

|  |  |
| :--- | :--- |
|  |  |
| Effect | -2 |
| Intercept | 304 |
| Q3_1 | 304 |
| Q3_2 | 304 |
| Q3_3 | 304 |
| Q3-4 | 304 |
| Q3_5 | 304 |
| Q4 | 305 |
| Q5 | 307 |
| Q6 | 305 |
| Q7 | 305 |
| Q8 | 305 |
| Q9 | 304 |
| Q12 | 304 |
| Q13 | 304 |
| Q14 | 305 |
| Q15 | 307 |
| DX1 | 305 |
| DX2 | 305 |
| DX6 | $304:$ |
| DX14 | 310 |
| DX15 | $305:$ |
| DX16 | 305 |
| DX17 | 304 |
| DX18 | 304 |
| Q1 | 307 |
| Q10 | $306!$ |
| Q11 | 3061 |
| DX3 | $317!$ |
| DX5 | $304 i$ |
| DX7 | 3081 |
| DX8 | 311 |
| DX9 | $316:$ |
| DX10 | $322:$ |
| DX11 | $304:$ |
| DX12 | $305 i$ |
| DX19 | $309:$ |

Table 10.A2 Summary MNL model estimation results for levels 3 and 4
(poor and seniors $+G S T$ )

| Effect | Give revenues to poor and seniors |  |  |  | Use revenues to reduce the GST |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | -2 LL | Chi-sq. | df | Sig | -2 LL | Chi-sq. | df | Sig |
| Intercept | 3041.305 | 0.000 | 0 | - | 2686.809 | 0.000 | 0 | - |
| Q3_1 | 3041.786 | 0.481 | 2 | 0.786 | 2693.743 | 6.934 | 2 | 0.031 |
| Q3_2 | 3042.740 | 1.434 | 2 | 0.488 | 2690.885 | 4.076 | 2 | 0.130 |
| Q3 3 | 3046.034 | 4.728 | 2 | 0.094 | 2688.554 | 1.745 | 2 | 0.418 |
| Q3 4 | 3043.866 | 2.560 | 2 | 0.278 | 2687.126 | 0.317 | 2 | 0.853 |
| Q3. 5 | 3047.914 | 6.609 | 2 | 0.037 | 2704.385 | 17.576 | 2 | 0.000 |
| Q4 | 3050.231 | 8.926 | 2 | 0.012 | 2696.575 | 9.766 | 2 | 0.008 |
| Q5 | 3070.832 | 29.527 | 2 | 0.000 | 2699.773 | 12.964 | 2 | 0.002 |
| Q6 | 3055.514 | 14.208 | 2 | 0.001 | 2703.989 | 17.180 | 2 | 0.000 |
| Q7 | 3050.475 | 9.170 | 2 | 0.010 | 2713.450 | 26.641 | 2 | 0.000 |
| Q8 | 3054.643 | 13.338 | 2 | 0.001 | 2688.617 | 1.808 | 2 | 0.405 |
| Q9 | 3042.226 | 0.921 | 2 | 0.631 | 2697.987 | 11.178 | 2 | 0.004 |
| Q12 | 3041.374 | 0.069 | 2 | 0.966 | 2697.156 | 10.347 | 2 | 0.006 |
| Q13 | 3046.818 | 5.512 | 2 | 0.064 | 2693.651 | 6.842 | 2 | 0.033 |
| Q14 | 3053.514 | 12.209 | 2 | 0.002 | 2699.642 | 12.833 | 2 | 0.002 |
| Q15 | 3075.189 | 33.883 | 2 | 0.000 | 2697.384 | 10.575 | 2 | 0.005 |
| DX1 | 3053.640 | 12.334 | 2 | 0.002 | 2687.049 | 0.240 | 2 | 0.887 |
| DX2 | 3057.049 | 15.744 | 2 | 0.000 | 2707.686 | 20.877 | 2 | 0.000 |
| DX6 | 3048.702 | 7.397 | 2 | 0.025 | 2689.338 | 2.529 | 2 | 0.282 |
| DX14 | 3107.223 | 65.917 | 2 | 0.000 | 2695.395 | 8.586 | 2 | 0.014 |
| DX15 | 3055.979 | 14.673 | 2 | 0.001 | 2694.105 | 7.296 | 2 | 0.026 |
| DX16 | 3058.219 | 16.913 | 2 | 0.000 | 2687.931 | 1.122 | 2 | 0.571 |
| DX17 | 3044.340 | 3.035 | 2 | 0.219 | 2697.667 | 10.858 | 2 | 0.004 |
| DX18 | 3044.391 | 3.086 | 2 | 0.214 | 2690.823 | 4.014 | 2 | 0.134 |
| Q1 | 3074.336 | 33.030 | 4 | 0.000 | 2697.039 | 10.230 | 4 | 0.037 |
| Q10 | 3069.640 | 28.335 | 12 | 0.005 | 2720.417 | 33.608 | 12 | 0.001 |
| Q11 | 3066.051 | 24.745 | 6 | 0.000 | 2700.644 | 13.835 | 6 | 0.032 |
| DX3 | 3179.257 | 137.951 | 24 | 0.000 | 2755.015 | 68.206 | 24 | 0.000 |
| DX5 | 3048.528 | 7.222 | 4 | 0.125 | 2696.316 | 9.507 | 4 | 0.050 |
| DX7 | 3080.969 | 39.664 | 6 | 0.000 | 2710.881 | 24.072 | 6 | 0.001 |
| DX8 | 3117.930 | 76.625 | 16 | 0.000 | 2756.130 | 69.321 | 16 | 0.000 |
| DX9 | 3163.770 | 122.464 | 14 | 0.000 | 2716.691 | 29.882 | 14 | 0.008 |
| DX10 | 3221.552 | 180.246 | 16 | 0.000 | 2749.562 | 62.753 | 16 | 0.000 |
| DX11 | 3042.038 | 0.732 | 2 | 0.693 | 2697.571 | 10.762 | 2 | 0.005 |
| DX12 | 3056.647 | 15.341 | 4 | 0.004 | 2689.497 | 2.688 | 4 | 0.611 |
| DX19 | 3097.129 | 55.824 | 10 | 0.000 | 2734.930 | 48.121 | 10 | 0.000 |

Table 10.A3 MNL model parameter estimation results for two levels (poor and seniors +

| BWS outcome |  | BWS outcome = least ( -1 ) |  |  |  | BWS outcome $=$ most $(+1)$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Est. | S.E. | Wald | Sig | Est. | S.E. | Wald | Sig |
| -1 | Intercept | -0.974 | 1.414 | 0.475 | 0.491 | -0.237 | 1.874 | 0.016 | 0.899 |
|  | Q3_1 | 0.159 | 0.236 | 0.454 | 0.500 | 0.553 | 0.290 | 3.625 | 0.057 |
|  | Q3_2 | -0.240 | 0.240 | 0.996 | 0.318 | -0.370 | 0.291 | 1.613 | 0.204 |
|  | Q3_3 | 0.190 | 0.145 | 1.711 | 0.191 | 0.212 | 0.175 | 1.455 | 0.228 |
|  | Q3_4 | 0.089 | 0.189 | 0.224 | 0.636 | -0.092 | 0.235 | 0.154 | . 0.694 |
|  | Q3_5 | 0.131 | 0.213 | 0.379 | 0.538 | 0.301 | 0.257 | 1.377 | 0.241 |
|  | Q4 | -0.673 | 0.230 | 8.586 | 0.003 | 0.232 | 0.271 | 0.733 | 0.392 |
|  | Q5 | -0.017 | 0.075 | 0.050 | 0.823 | -0.106 | 0.094 | 1.285 | 0.257 |
|  | Q6 | -0.199 | 0.183 | 1.184 | 0.277 | -0.825 | 0.216 | 14.531 | 0.000 |
|  | Q7 | 0.134 | 0.121 | 1.222 | 0.269 | -0.178 | 0.143 | 1.551 | 0.213 |
|  | Q8 | 0.571 | 0.157 | 13.309 | 0.000 | -0.044 | 0.197 | 0.051 | 0.822 |
|  | Q9 | -0.052 | 0.082 | 0.399 | 0.528 | 0.095 | 0.096 | 0.975 | 0.324 |
|  | Q12 | 0.014 | 0.159 | 0.007 | 0.931 | 0.069 | 0.200 | 0.119 | 0.730 |
|  | Q13 | 0.221 | 0.094 | 5.483 | 0.019 | -0.194 | 0.119 | 2.648 | 0.104 |
|  | Q14 | 0.509 | 0.153 | 11.091 | 0.001 | -0.248 | 0.175 | 1.998 | 0.157 |
|  | Q15 | -1.080 | 0.224 | 23.297 | 0.000 | -0.228 | 0.241 | 0.900 | 0.343 |
|  | DX1 | 0.160 | 0.160 | 1.002 | 0.317 | 0.047 | 0.181 | 0.068 | 0.794 |
|  | DX2 | -0.151 | 0.046 | 10.919 | 0.001 | -0.014 | 0.055 | 0.063 | 0.802 |
|  | DX6 | 0.003 | 0.005 | 0.388 | 0.533 | -0.010 | 0.007 | 2.111 | 0.146 |
|  | DX14 | 0.200 | 0.043 | 21.758 | 0.000 | 0.146 | 0.052 | 7.813 | 0.005 |
|  | DX15 | -0.322 | 0.104 | 9.621 | 0.002 | -0.320 | 0.124 | 6.626 | 0.010 |
|  | DX16 | -0.058 | 0.043 | 1.861 | 0.172 | 0.052 | 0.049 | 1.118 | 0.290 |
|  | DX17 | 0.020 | 0.025 | 0.640 | 0.424 | 0.087 | 0.032 | 7.569 | 0.006 |
|  | DX18 | 0.037 | 0.033 | 1.230 | 0.267 | -0.082 | 0.041 | 3.919 | 0.048 |
|  | [Q1 = 1] | 0.113 | 0.169 | 0.445 | 0.505 | $-0.066$ | 0.193 | 0.115 | 0.734 |
|  | $[\mathrm{Q} 1=2]$ | 0.115 | 0.175 | 0.434 | 0.510 | 0.443 | 0.201 | 4.869 | 0.027 |
|  | $[\mathrm{Q} 1=3]$ | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
|  | $[\mathrm{Q} 10=1]$ | 0.488 | 0.210 | 5.380 | 0.020 | -0.929 | 0.256 | 13.164 | 0.000 |
|  | $[\mathrm{Q} 10=2]$ | 0.503 | 0.400 | 1.587 | 0.208 | -0.188 | 0.431 | 0.191 | 0.662 |
|  | $[\mathrm{Q} 10=3]$ | -0.205 | 0.453 | 0.205 | 0.651 | 0.561 | 0.466 | 1.449 | 0.229 |
|  | $[\mathrm{Q} 10=4]$ | 0.763 | 0.244 | 9.793 | 0.002 | -0.636 | 0.283 | 5.052 | 0.025 |
|  | $[\mathrm{Q} 10=5]$ | -0.021 | 0.548 | 0.002 | 0.969 | -0.592 | 0.547 | 1.172 | 0.279 |
|  | $[\mathrm{Q} 10=6]$ | -0.111 | 0.221 | 0.254 | 0.615 | -0.839 | 0.265 | 9.977 | 0.002 |
|  | [Q10 = 7] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
|  | $[\mathrm{Q} 11=1]$ | -0.463 | 0.268 | 2.996 | 0.083 | 0.758 | 0.333 | 5.193 | 0.023 |
|  | [Q11 = 2] | -0.771 | 0.301 | 6.577 | 0.010 | 0.181 | 0.370 | 0.239 | 0.625 |
|  | $[\mathrm{Q} 11=3]$ | -0.390 | 0.251 | 2.410 | 0.121 | 0.332 | 0.309 | 1.154 | 0.283 |
|  | $[\mathrm{Q} 11=4]$ | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
|  | $[\mathrm{DX3}=1]$ | -0.835 | 0.668 | 1.562 | 0.211 | 0.398 | 1.157 | 0.118 | 0.731 |
|  | [DX3 $=2$ ] | 0.495 | 0.673 | 0.540 | 0.462 | 0.159 | 1.166 | 0.018 | 0.892 |

BWS outcome
[DX3 $=3$ [DX3 $=4$ [DX3 $=5$ $\begin{aligned} {[\mathrm{DX} 3} & =6 \\ \mathrm{DXX} & =7\end{aligned}$ DX3 $=7$
DX3 $=8$ [DX3 $=9$ [DX3 $=1$ DX3 $=1$ [DX3 $=$ [DX3 $=$ [DX5 = [DX5 $=$ ? [DX5 $=$ [DX7 = [DX7 = [DX7 = : $[\mathrm{DX7}=$ [DX8 = : [DX8 $=$ [DX8 =
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[DX10 =
[DX10 = [DX10 $=$
or and seniors +
$\overline{z=\operatorname{most}(+1)}$

| Wald | Sig |
| ---: | :--- |
| 0.016 | 0.899 |
| 3.625 | 0.057 |
| 1.613 | 0.204 |
| 1.455 | 0.228 |
| 0.154 | 0.694 |
| 1.377 | 0.241 |
| 0.733 | 0.392 |
| 1.285 | 0.257 |
| 14.531 | 0.000 |
| 1.551 | 0.213 |
| 0.051 | 0.822 |
| 0.975 | 0.324 |
| 0.119 | 0.730 |
| 2.648 | 0.104 |
| 1.998 | 0.157 |
| 0.900 | 0.343 |
| 0.068 | 0.794 |
| 0.063 | 0.802 |
| 2.111 | 0.146 |
| 7.813 | 0.005 |
| 6.626 | 0.010 |
| 1.118 | 0.290 |
| 7.569 | 0.006 |
| 3.919 | 0.048 |
| 0.115 | 0.734 |
| 4.869 | 0.027 |

$13.164 \quad 0.000$
$0.191 \quad 0.662$
$1.449 \quad 0.229$
5.0520 .025
$1.172 \quad 0.279$
9.9770 .002

| $\overline{5} .193$ | $\overline{0.023}$ |
| :--- | :--- |

$0.239 \quad 0.625$
$1.154 \quad 0.283$
$0.118 \quad 0.731$
$0.018 \quad 0.892$

Table 10.A3 (cont.)

| BWS outcome | BWS outcome $=$ least ( -1 ) |  |  |  | BWS outcome $=$ most $(+1)$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Est. | S.E. | Wald | Sig | Est. | S.E. | Wald | Sig |
| [DX3 = 3] | -1.246 | 0.675 | 3.410 | 0.065 | -0.292 | 1.162 | 0.063 | 0.801 |
| [DX3 $=4$ ] | -1.120 | 0.753 | 2.210 | 0.137 | 0.199 | 1.189 | 0.028 | 0.867 |
| [DX3 $=5$ ] | -0.510 | 0.675 | 0.571 | 0.450 | -0.059 | 1.175 | 0.002 | 0.960 |
| [DX3 $=6$ ] | 0.163 | 0.678 | 0.057 | 0.811 | 0.419 | 1.173 | 0.127 | 0.721 |
| [DX3 $=7$ ] | -0.417 | 0.691 | 0.363 | 0.547 | 0.124 | 1.183 | 0.011 | 0.916 |
| [DX3 $=8$ ] | -0.540 | 0.749 | 0.520 | 0.471 | 0.340 | 1.268 | 0.072 | 0.788 |
| [DX3 $=9$ ] | -0.867 | 0.677 | 1.641 | 0.200 | -0.007 | 1.171 | 0.000 | 0.996 |
| [DX3 $=10$ ] | -3.020 | 1.272 | 5.634 | 0.018 | 0.890 | 1.272 | 0.489 | 0.484 |
| [DX3 = 11] | -0.907 | 0.701 | 1.674 | 0.196 | 0.523 | 1.179 | 0.197 | 0.658 |
| [DX3 $=12$ ] | -0.946 | 0.686 | 1.901 | 0.168 | 0.336 | 1.183 | 0.081 | 0.776 |
| [DX3 = 13] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - |  |  |
| [DX5 = 1] | 0.696 | 0.299 | 5.409 | 0.02 | -0.010 | 0.32 | 0.001 | 0.976 |
| [DX5 $=2$ ] | 0.268 | 0.366 | 0.538 | 0.463 | $-0.530$ | 0.388 | 1.864 | 0.172 |
| [DX5 = 3] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - |  |
| [DX7 $=1$ ] | 0.707 | 0.325 | 4.726 | 0.030 | 0.508 | 0.400 | 1.614 | . 20 |
| [DX7 $=2$ ] | 0.926 | 0.353 | 6.871 | 0.009 | 1.239 | 0.415 | 8.920 | 0.003 |
| [DX7 $=3$ ] | 0.307 | 0.324 | 0.897 | 0.344 | 0.619 | 0.402 | 2.378 | 0.123 |
| [DX7 $=4$ ] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - |  |
| [DX8 $=1$ ] | 0.198 | 0.476 | 0.173 | 0.677 | -0.338 | 0.482 | 0.493 | 0.483 |
| [DX8 = 2] | -0.201 | 0.524 | 0.148 | 0.701 | 0.546 | 0.541 | 1.021 | 0.312 |
| [DX8 = 3] | -0.826 | 0.521 | 2.512 | 0.113 | -0.064 | 0.557 | 0.013 | 0.909 |
| [DX8 = 4] | -0.091 | 0.443 | 0.042 | 0.838 | -0.380 | 0.480 | 0.6026 | 0.429 |
| [DX8 $=5$ ] | -0.262 | 0.440 | 0.355 | 0.551 | 0.125 | 0.478 | 0.069 | 0.793 |
| [DX8 = 6] | -0.644 | 0.437 | 2.170 | 0.141 | 0.599 | 0.452 | 1.753 | . 185 |
| [DX8 $=7$ ] | -0.410 | 0.434 | 0.894 | 0.344 | 0.023 | 0.460 | 0.003 | 0.960 |
| [DX8 $=8$ ] | -1.084 | 0.480 | 5.099 | 0.024 | -0.426 | 0.445 | 0.917 | 0.338 |
| [DX8 $=9$ ] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| [DX9 = 1] | 1.428 | 0.404 | 12.514 | 0.000 | -0.007 | 0.468 | 0.000 | 0.987 |
| [DX9 = 2] | 1.894 | 0.347 | 29.795 | 0.000 | 0.508 | 0.410 | 1.534 | 0.215 |
| [DX9 = 3] | 1.214 | 0.317 | 14.648 | 0.000 | 0.814 | 0.348 | 5.472 | 0.019 |
| [ $\mathrm{DX9} 9=4$ ] | -0.470 | 0.456 | 1.061 | 0.303 | 0.026 | 0.535 | 0.002 | 0.962 |
| [DX9 = 5] | 1.177 | 0.797 | 2.178 | 0.140 | 0.439 | 0.624 | 0.494 | 0.482 |
| [DX9 = 6] | 0.136 | 0.398 | 0.118 | 0.732 | 0.090 | 0.540 | 0.028 | 0.868 |
| [DX9 = 7] | 1.057 | 0.472 | 5.010. | 0.025 | 0.285 | 0.460 | 0.383 | 0.536 |
| [DX9 = 8] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - |  | - |
| [DX10 = 1] | -1.712 | 0.274 | 39.107 | 0.000 | -0.769 | 0.309 | 6.193 | 0.013 |
| [DX10 $=2$ ] | -1.147 | 0.346 | 10.962 | 0.001 | -0.496 | 0.365 | 1.842 | 0.175 |
| [DX10 = 3] | -1.062 | 0.259 | 16.872 | 0.000 | -0.880 | 0.310 | 8.073 | 0.004 |
| [DX10=4] | -1.251 | 0.333 | 14.090 | 0.000 | -1.426 | 0.419 | 11.591 | 0.001 |
| [DX10 = 5] | -1.169 | 0.396 | 8.699 | 0.003 | -0.394 | 0.464 | 0.721 | 0.396 |
| [DX10 = 6] | -0.940 | 0.241 | 15.176 | 0.000 | 0.070 | 0.269 | 0.067 | 0.795 |

Table 10.A3 (cont.)

| BWS outcome | BWS outcome $=$ least ( -1 ) |  |  |  | BWS outcome $=\operatorname{most}(+1)$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Est. | S.E. | Wald | Sig | Est. | S.E. | Wald | Sig |
| [DX10 = 7] | 0.605 | 0.406 | 2.222 | 0.136 | 0.715 | 0.451 | 2.508 | 0.113 |
| $[\mathrm{DX10}=8$ ] | -2.341 | 0.491 | 22.732 | 0.000 | -1.163 | 0.508 | 5.253 | 0.022 |
| $[\mathrm{DX10}=9]$ | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| $[\mathrm{DX11}=1]$ | -0.235 | 0.280 | 0.707 | 0.400 | -0.197 | 0.346 | 0.323 | 0.570 |
| [DX11 $=2]$ | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| [DX12 $=1$ ] | 0.206 | 0.200 | 1.060 | 0.303 | -0.374 | 0.241 | 2.424 | 0.119 |
| [DX12 $=2$ ] | 0.487 | 0.229 | 4.533 | 0.033 | -0.241 | 0.261 | 0.853 | 0.356 |
| [DX12 $=3$ ] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| [DX19 = 0] | -0.705 | 0.173 | 16.519 | 0.000 | -0.104 | 0.213 | 0.241 | 0.624 |
| [DX19 = 1] | -0.141 | 0.195 | 0.522 | 0.470 | 0.069 | 0.251 | 0.075 | 0.784 |
| [DX19 = 2] | -0.895 | 0.265 | 11.401 | 0.001 | -0.273 | 0.316 | 0.746 | 0.388 |
| [DX19 = 3] | 0.607 | 0.773 | 0.616 | 0.432 | -1.924 | 1.105 | 3.031 | 0.082 |
| [DX19 = 4] | -1.836 | 0.637 | 8.308 | 0.004 | -0.167 | 0.671 | 0.062 | 0.803 |
| [DX19 = 5] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| Intercept | -2.073 | 1.124 | 3.401 | 0.065 | -0.362 | 1.068 | 0.115 | 0.735 |
| Q3_1 | 0.055 | 0.165 | 0.110 | 0.740 | -0.187 | 0.156 | 1.448 | 0.229 |
| Q3_2 | -0.163 | 0.176 | 0.859 | 0.354 | 0.198 | 0.169 | 1.374 | 0.241 |
| Q3_3 | 0.221 | 0.108 | 4.155 | 0.042 | 0.085 | 0.101 | 0.707 | 0.400 |
| Q3 4 | -0.184 | 0.141 | 1.707 | 0.191 | -0.064 | 0.130 | 0.246 | 0.620 |
| Q3_5 | 0.428 | 0.167 | 6.548 | 0.010 | 0.649 | 0.156 | 17.355 | 0.000 |
| Q4 | -0.179 | 0.162 | 1.212 | 0.271 | -0.400 | 0.150 | 7.103 | 0.008 |
| Q5 | 0.291 | 0.057 | 25.956 | 0.000 | 0.153 | 0.051 | 8.854 | 0.003 |
| Q6 | 0.424 | 0.135 | 9.824 | 0.002 | 0.071 | 0.126 | 0.322 | 0.570 |
| Q7 | -0.214 | 0.090 | 5.653 | 0.017 | -0.437 | 0.086 | 25.998 | 0.000 |
| Q8 | 0.124 | 0.118 | 1.094 | 0.296 | 0.132 | 0.108 | 1.483 | 0.223 |
| Q9 | 0.030 | 0.060 | 0.251 | 0.617 | 0.185 | 0.055 | 11.094 | 0.001 |
| Q12 | -0.025 | 0.119 | 0.044 | 0.834 | 0.346 | 0.109 | 10.032 | 0.002 |
| Q13 | 0.035 | 0.072 | 0.238 | 0.626 | 0.107 | 0.068 | 2.470 | 0.116 |
| Q14 | 0.006 | 0.110 | 0.003 | 0.954 | 0.283 | 0.102 | 7.744 | 0.005 |
| Q15 | 0.298 | 0.171 | 3.026 | 0.082 | 0.456 | 0.165 | 7.637 | 0.006 |
| DX1 | 0.402 | 0.115 | 12.263 | 0.000 | 0.051 | 0.109 | 0.218 | 0.640 |
| DX2 | -0.105 | 0.035 | 9.298 | 0.002 | -0.146 | 0.033 | 19.794 | 0.000 |
| DX6 | 0.008 | 0.003 | 7.234 | 0.007 | -0.001 | 0.003 | 0.105 | 0.746 |
| DX14 | -0.167 | 0.034 | 23.799 | 0.000 | -0.002 | 0.031 | 0.006 | 0.937 |
| DX15 | 0.086 | 0.075 | 1.318 | 0.251 | -0.098 | 0.071 | 1.927 | 0.165 |
| DX16 | 0.107 | 0.032 | 11.350 | 0.001 | 0.011 | 0.029 | 0.145 | 0.703 |
| DX17 | -0.023 | 0.019 | 1.487 | 0.223 | -0.017 | 0.017 | 0.979 | 0.323 |
| DX18 | -0.025 | 0.025 | 0.991 | 0.319 | -0.008 | 0.023 | 0.124 | 0.725 |
| [Q1 $=1$ ] | 0.391 | 0.126 | 9.583 | 0.002 | 0.070 | 0.118 | 0.348 | 0.555 |
| [Q1 $=2$ ] | 0.706 | 0.129 | 29.854 | 0.000 | 0.296 | 0.119 | 6.209 | 0.013 |
| [Q1 $=3$ ] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |

Table 10.A3 (cont.)

| lost $(+1)$ |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| d | Sig |
| 08 | 0.113 |
| 153 | 0.022 |
|  | - |
| 23 | 0.570 |
|  | - |
| 24 | 0.119 |
| 53 | 0.356 |
|  | - |
| 41 | 0.624 |
| 75 | 0.784 |
| 46 | 0.388 |
| 31 | 0.082 |
| 62 | 0.803 |
|  | - |
| 15 | 0.735 |
| 48 | 0.229 |
| 74 | 0.241 |
| 07 | 0.400 |
| 46 | 0.620 |
| 55 | 0.000 |
| 03 | 0.008 |
| 54 | 0.003 |
| 22 | 0.570 |
| 98 | 0.000 |
| 83 | 0.223 |
| 94 | 0.001 |
| 32 | 0.002 |
| 70 | 0.116 |
| 44 | 0.005 |
| 37 | 0.006 |
| 18 | 0.640 |
| 94 | 0.000 |
| 35 | 0.746 |
| 36 | 0.937 |
| 27 | 0.165 |
| 45 | 0.703 |
| 79 | 0.323 |
| 24 | 0.725 |
| 48 | 0.555 |
| 39 | 0.013 |
|  |  |


| BWS outcome | BWS outcome $=$ least ( -1 ) |  |  |  | BWS outcome $=$ most $(+1)$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Est. | S.E. | Wald | Sig | Est. | S.E. | Wald | Sig |
| [Q10 = 1] | 0.110 | 0.170 | 0.420 | 0.517 | -0.337 | 0.155 | 4.721 | 0.030 |
| $[\mathrm{Q} 10=2]$ | 0.226 | 0.297 | 0.578 | 0.447 | -0.721 | 0.303 | 5.657 | 0.017 |
| $[\mathrm{Q} 10=3]$ | -0.180 | 0.344 | 0.274 | 0.601 | -0.530 | 0.329 | 2.588 | 0.108 |
| $[\mathrm{Q} 10=4]$ | 0.287 | 0.191 | 2.267 | 0.132 | -0.416 | 0.177 | 5.510 | 0.019 |
| $[\mathrm{Q} 10=5]$ | 0.241 | 0.321 | 0.562 | 0.454 | 0.318 | 0.323 | 0.973 | 0.324 |
| $[\mathrm{Q} 10=6]$ | 0.147 | 0.170 | 0.752 | 0.386 | -0.304 | 0.158 | 3.717 | 0.054 |
| [Q10 = 7] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| $[\mathrm{Q} 11=1]$ | -0.316 | 0.208 | 2.316 | 0.128 | 0.334 | 0.185 | 3.256 | 0.071 |
| [Q11 = 2] | -0.787 | 0.224 | 12.325 | 0.000 | 0.455 | 0.201 | 5.100 | 0.024 |
| $[\mathrm{Q} 11=3]$ | -0.102 | 0.191 | 0.287 | 0.592 | 0.372 | 0.168 | 4.914 | 0.027 |
| [Q11 = 4] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| [DX3 = 1] | -0.296 | 0.556 | 0.284 | 0.594 | -1.023 | 0.546 | 3.514 | 0.061 |
| [DX3 = 2] | -0.308 | 0.566 | 0.296 | 0.586 | -1.629 | 0.556 | 8.594 | 0.003 |
| [DX3 $=3$ ] | -0.300 | 0.554 | 0.294 | 0.587 | -1.308 | 0.544 | 5.784 | 0.016 |
| [DX3 = 4] | 0.341 | 0.580 | 0.347 | 0.556 | -1.133 | 0.570 | 3.951 | 0.047 |
| [DX3 $=5$ ] | -0.543 | 0.567 | 0.917 | 0.338 | -0.908 | 0.552 | 2.711 | 0.100 |
| $[\mathrm{DX3}=6]$ | -0.356 | 0.571 | 0.389 | 0.533 | -0.499 | 0.561 | 0.790 | 0.374 |
| [DX3 $=7]$ | -0.033 | 0.568 | 0.003 | 0.954 | -0.795 | 0.559 | 2.025 | 0.155 |
| [DX3 $=8]$ | -0.721 | 0.627 | 1.325 | 0.250 | -0.863 | 0.597 | 2.089 | 0.148 |
| [DX3 $=9]$ | -0.105 | 0.559 | 0.035 | 0.851 | -1.014 | 0.549 | 3.404 | 0.065 |
| [DX3 $=10$ ] | 1.495 | 0.681 | 4.823 | 0.028 | -1.053 | 0.651 | 2.614 | 0.106 |
| [DX3 $=11$ ] | -0.832 | 0.583 | 2.033 | 0.154 | -1.438 | 0.569 | 6.383 | 0.012 |
| [DX3 $=12$ ] | -0.244 | 0.564 | 0.186 | 0.666 | -0.318 | 0.554 | 0.329 | 0.566 |
| [DX3 = 13] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | -. |
| [DX5 = 1] | -0.020 | 0.208 | 0.009 | 0.923 | -0.432 | 0.192 | 5.070 | 0.024 |
| [DX5 = 2] | -0.089 | 0.246 | 0.133 | 0.716 | -0.136 | 0.228 | 0.357 | 0.550 |
| [DX5 $=3]$ | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| [DX7 = 1] | 0.515 | 0.242 | 4.519 | 0.034 | 0.654 | 0.223 | 8.572 | 0.003 |
| [DX7 $=2]$ | 0.971 | 0.259 | 14.089 | 0.000 | 0.637 | 0.240 | 7.041 | 0.008 |
| [DX7 $=3$ ] | 0.889 | 0.240 | 13.693 | 0.000 | 0.501 | 0.220 | 5.179 | 0.023 |
| $[\mathrm{DX7}=4]$ | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| [DX8 = 1] | -0.231 | 0.311 | 0.551 | 0.458 | 0.276 | 0.299 | 0.852 | 0.356 |
| [DX8 = 2] | 0.785 | 0.360 | 4.754 | 0.029 | 0.519 | 0.342 | 2.306 | 0.129 |
| [DX8 = 3] | -0.073 | 0.369 | 0.040 | 0.842 | -0.049 | 0.349 | 0.020 | 0.888 |
| [DX8 $=4$ ] | -0.310 | 0.313 | 0.978 | 0.323 | -0.431 | 0.297 | 2.102 | 0.147 |
| [DX8 = 5] | 0.248 | 0.297 | 0.698 | 0.403 | 0.096 | 0.286 | 0.113 | 0.737 |
| [DX8 $=6$ ] | 0.298 | 0.293 | 1.039 | 0.308 | 0.139 | 0.284 | 0.240 | 0.624 |
| $[\mathrm{DX8}=7]$ | 0.633 | 0.280 | 5.119 | 0.024 | 0.870 | 0.271 | 10.345 | 0.001 |
| [DX8 = 8] | 0.104 | 0.273 | 0.144 | 0.705 | -0.129 | 0.273 | 0.222 | 0.637 |
| [DX8 $=9]$ | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| [DX9 = 1] | -0.004 | 0.282 | 0.000 | 0.988 | 0.203 | 0.264 | 0.593 | 0.441 |

Table 10.A3 (cont.)

| BWS outcome | BWS outcome $=$ least ( -1 ) |  |  |  | BWS outcome $=$ most $(+1)$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Est. | S.E. | Wald | Sig | Est. | S.E. | Wald | Sig |
| [DX9 = 2] | 0.076 | 0.247 | 0.094 | 0.759 | -0.037 | 0.231 | 0.026 | 0.872 |
| [DX9 = 3] | 0.394 | 0.212 | 3.438 | 0.064 | -0.001 | 0.204 | 0.000 | 0.998 |
| $[\mathrm{DX9} 9=4]$ | 0.659 | 0.250 | 6.941 | 0.008 | 0.102 | 0.250 | 0.166 | 0.683 |
| [DX9 = 5] | 1.241 | 0.422 | 8.632 | 0.003 | 0.398 | 0.400 | 0.990 | 0.320 |
| [DX9 $=6$ ] | 0.002 | 0.304 | 0.000 | 0.994 | 0.414 | 0.284 | 2.121 | 0.145 |
| [DX9 = 7] | 1.776 | 0.287 | 38.298 | 0.000 | 0.788 | 0.271 | 8.435 | 0.004 |
| [DX9 = 8] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| [DX10 = 1] | -0.705 | 0.205 | 11.812 | 0.001 | -0.104 | 0.191 | 0.297 | 0.586 |
| [DX10 = 2] | 0.236 | 0.240 | 0.968 | 0.325 | -0.389 | 0.229 | 2.891 | 0.089 |
| [DX10 = 3] | -1.160 | 0.213 | 29.587 | 0.000 | -0.247 | 0.189 | 1.705 | 0.192 |
| [DX10 = 4] | 0.525 | 0.230 | 5.221 | 0.022 | -0.074 | 0.218 | 0.116 | 0.733 |
| [DX10 = 5] | 0.409 | 0.267 | 2.346 | 0.126 | 0.145 | 0.249 | 0.341 | 0.559 |
| [DX10 = 6] | -0.038 | 0.188 | 0.042 | 0.838 | 0.184 | 0.177 | 1.088 | 0.297 |
| [DX10 = 7] | -0.039 | 0.330 | 0.014 | 0.906 | -0.408 | 0.317 | 1.664 | 0.197 |
| [DX10 = 8] | -1.345 | 0.297 | 20.436 | 0.000 | -0.882 | 0.271 | 10.558 | 0.001 |
| [DX10 = 9] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| [DX11 = 1] | -0.100 | 0.235 | 0.180 | 0.672 | -0.703 | 0.217 | 10.528 | 0.001 |
| [DX11 $=2$ ] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| [DX12 = 1] | -0.093 | 0.149 | 0.394 | 0.530 | -0.023 | 0.138 | 0.028 | 0.867 |
| [DX12 = 2] | -0.414 | 0.164 | 6.390 | 0.011 | 0.041 | 0.153 | 0.070 | 0.791 |
| [DX12 = 3] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| [DX19 = 0] | -0.338 | 0.122 | 7.611 | 0.006 | -0.520 | 0.114 | 20.703 | 0.000 |
| [DX19 = 1] | -0.341 | 0.151 | 5.134 | 0.023 | -0.253 | 0.138 | 3.371 | 0.066 |
| [DX19 = 2] | -0.800 | 0.212 | 14.226 | 0.000 | -1.066 | 0.199 | 28.635 | 0.000 |
| [DX19 = 3] | -1.182 | 0.473 | 6.247 | 0.012 | -0.542 | 0.414 | 1.716 | 0.190 |
| [DX19 = 4] | 0.592 | 0.430 | 1.895 | 0.169 | -1.160 | 0.409 | 8.056 | 0.005 |
| [DX19 = 5] | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - |

This chapter use with attributes : conservative ma Case 2 study co Szeinbach et al., methods of ana (sample-level) s choice frequenc ICECAP-O instI chapter was part tation strategies the methodologi reported as per th more detailed $g$ evaluation, see I Case 2 BWS to conservative ma tance identified :

The study was c logical issues at Economists' Stu posed data analy scale, have devt
${ }^{1}$ Funding was obtaine "Effective practice? . extraction of third ms of the study:


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Carson, Lorviere and Wei (2010) provide a discussion about why these attributes were central to the policy debate that took place in Anstralia and look at data from an earlier survey using these attributes to define a possible emissions trading scheme. Their results are simitar to those reported here, suggesting temporal stability at the aggregate level over about a one-year time period.
    2 From a political science median voter perspective, it not surprising to see the public split into roughly equal proportions on these attributes, as they are the ones that the major parties decided to contest with respect to competing visions of the details of an emissions trading scheme. A Liberal Party leadership shift in 2009 resulted in the party being opposed to the implementation of any ETS.

[^1]:    ${ }^{3}$ Labour is the major center-left party and, at the time of the survey, formed the government with the Greens, who have an environmentalist orientation. The Liberal Party is the mainstream center-right party, and is often in a coalition with the Nationals, who are strong in rural areas. The (Liberal) Democrats have a libertarian orientation.

