Michael Callen
Graduate Student – Department of Economics
Phone: (858) 534-2230
Email: mjcallen@ucsd.edu
Publications
Abstract: Most aid spending by governments seeking to rebuild social and political order is based on an opportunity-cost theory of distracting potential recruits. The logic is that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence, implying a positive correlation between unemployment and violence in locations with active insurgencies. We test that prediction in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines, using survey data on unemployment and two newly-available measures of insurgency: (1) attacks against government and allied forces; and (2) violence that kills civilians. Contrary to the opportunity-cost theory, the data emphatically reject a positive correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces (p<.05%). There is no significant relationship between unemployment and the rate of insurgent attacks that kill civilians. We identify several potential explanations, introducing the notion of insurgent precision to adjudicate between the possibilities that predation on the one hand, and security measures and information costs on the other, account for the negative correlation between unemployment and violence in these three conflicts.
(NBER version with statistical appendix on jointly testing the same hypothesis with data from different countries: NBER Version w/ Statistical Appendix)
(New York Times/Freakonomics review: Do Jobs Really Cure Violence?)
Abstract: A key challenge faced by democratizing conflict and post-conflict countries is the implementation of free and fair elections. In many fragile democracies, election commissions are not functionally independent. The state is formally responsible for regulating fraud and staffed by incumbent affiliates who have strong incentives and the institutional access necessary to perpetrate fraud. Parallel to this, violence and political contestation may weaken state institutions for fraud prevention and simultaneously limit the ability of fraud perpetrators affiliated with the state to operate. We develop a theory that predicts an inverted-u shaped relationship between state presence and fraud--where the state is absent, it is unable to perpetrate fraud in support of the incumbent, where it has moderate control, manipulators can operate with impunity, and where state presence is robust, sufficient oversight exists to deter fraud. We test our theory using results from the 2009 presidential election in Afghanistan, an economic survey carried out in 383 of Afghanistan’s 398 districts, event data on insurgent attacks both from press reports and from coalition military records, and data on fraud from ballot boxes investigated during the national recount. Our results confirm the predicted concave relationship--fraud increases with violence in secure areas but decreases with violence in contested areas.
Revise and Resubmit
Abstract: We present a model where the enforcement of international risk sharing contracts is costly. With non-diversifiable enforcement costs, welfare is not necessarily maximized for perfect worldwide risk sharing. Some groupings, or "pools" of countries can deliver higher welfare, with higher diversification gains net of enforcement costs. We construct an exhaustive list of such pools of countries. For each pool, we compute the volatility of poolwide consumption and Gross Domestic Product growth, and compare it with the volatility in each country individually. From the difference, we infer the diversification and welfare gains--gross of enforcement costs--associated with risk sharing for each pool. Welfare gains increase quickly with the size of the pool. Groupings of as few as seven countries deliver two-thirds of the maximum obtained with full worldwide integration. They are composed of heterogeneous countries, and are typically not observed, presumably because enforcement costs are large. A contrario, the few risk sharing agreements we do observe usually have a regional dimension, high trade, and presumably low diversification gains, but low enforcement costs. We conclude large welfare gains remain untapped because the enforcement of international risk sharing is costly.
Technical Appendix to Pooling Risk Among Countries
Working Papers
Abstract: Elections in developing countries commonly fail to deliver accountability because of manipulation, often involving collusion between corrupt election officials and political candidates. We report the results of an experimental evaluation of Photo Quick Count---a monitoring technology designed to detect the illegal sale of votes by corrupt election officials to candidates---carried out in 471 polling centers across Afghanistan during the 2010 parliamentary elections. The intervention reduced theft of election materials by about 60 percent and vote counts for predictably corrupt candidates by about 25 percent, with estimates also suggesting a fraud-reducing spatial treatment externality. Last, we provide evidence that both the effect of monitoring and the strategic response of candidates seeking to recover votes depend on pre-existing political connections to election commission officials. We explain these results in the context of a theory of corrupt vote transactions in which the capacity of candidates to protect corrupt officials determines the effect of new monitoring regimes and the mix of corrupt activities officials will undertake on behalf of candidates.
(Our project is honored as one of seven innovations selected for the White House Innovation in Development Event)
(USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah mentions the project as an example of the importance of innovation and evaluation)
(Coverage in Slate - The Dismal Science: A Picture of Democracy)
(Coverage at The Economist blog: How to Save Votes)
(Coverage at the Monkey Cage blog: Digital Cameras Reduce Electoral Corruption)
(Coverage in Foreign Policy - The AfPak Channel: Point and Shoot Elections)
Abstract: We investigate the relationship between violent trauma and economic risk preferences in Afghanistan combining: (i) a two-part experimental procedure identifying risk preferences, violations of Expected Utility (EU), and specific preferences for certainty; (ii) controlled recollection of fear based on established methods from psychology; and (iii) artefactual violence data from precisely geocoded military records. We document a specific preference for certainty in violation of EU. The preference for certainty, which we term a Certainty Premium, is exacerbated by the combination of violent exposure and controlled fearful recollections. The results have implications for risk-taking and are potentially actionable for policymakers and marketers.
Projects
(Project Summary)
(Project Summary)
