

Luz Marina Arias López Montes

Department of Economics
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Dr Dept 0508
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508

luarias@ucsd.edu
<http://econ.ucsd.edu/~luarias>
Phone: (650) 387-7832

EDUCATION

1995–2000 B.A. in Economics (Hons.) Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM).
2002–2008 Ph.D. in Economics, Stanford University (January 2008).
Thesis Title: *Coordination or Coercion in the Provision of Goods by the State: Theory and Insights from Colonial Mexico.*
Committee: Prof. Avner Greif (Primary Advisor), Prof. B. Douglas Bernheim (Primary Advisor), Prof. Stephen Haber, Prof. David Baron.

FIELDS

Political Economics, Economic Development, Economic History.

FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS

2009–2010 Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
2008–2009 Postdoctoral Fellowship, Center for US-Mexican Studies, UC San Diego.
2007–2008 Hewlett Fellowship, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University.
2006–2007 Dissertation Fellowship, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University.
2006, 2007 Summer Fellowship, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School.
2005 Best Teaching Assistant Award (Autumn).
2002–2003 First Year Fellowship, Department of Economics, Stanford University.
2001 High Honors for B.A. Thesis, Mexican Institute of Executives in Finance (IMEF).
1995–1998 Public Education Ministry Fellowship, Mexico.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Aut 2009 Game Theory, Lecturer, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
Spr 2009 Game Theory, Lecturer, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
Spr 2006 Juniors Honors Seminar. Teaching Assistant (TA) for Prof. Rothwell, Stanford University.
Win 2006 Economic Policy Analysis. TA for Prof. Rothwell, Stanford University.
Aut 2005 Economic Policy Analysis. TA for Prof. Avner Greif, Stanford University.
Spr 2005 Economic Analysis II. TA for Prof. Steve Tadelis, Stanford University.
Aut 2004 Intro to Statistical Methods for Social Scientists, TA for Prof. Mark Tendall, Stanford University.
Spr 2004 Intro to Econometrics. TA for Prof. David McKenzie, Stanford University.
Win 2004 Intro to Statistical Methods for Social Scientists. TA for Prof. G. Tripathi, Stanford University.
Aut 2003 Economic Analysis I. TA for Prof. Matthew E. Kahn, Stanford University.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

2004, 2005 Research Assistant, Prof. Avner Greif, Stanford University (Summers).
2000–2002 Research Economist, Banco de México (Mexican Central Bank), Mexico City.
1999 Research Assistant, Professor Elisabeth Huybens, CIE, ITAM, Mexico City.
1999 Research Assistant, Professor Ignacio Lobato, CIE, ITAM, Mexico City.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

- June 2009 Organized jointly with Gabriela Torres-Mazuera the workshop ‘Native Peoples in the U.S. and Mexico: Approaches to Exclusion,’ at the Center for US-Mexican Studies, UC San Diego.
- June 2009 Workshop on The Great Death: Disease, Environment, Genetics and the Transformation of Mexican Colonial Society. Center for US-Mexican Studies, UC San Diego.
- December 2008 Social Science History Workshop, Economics Department, Stanford University.
- November 2008 Research Seminar. Center for US-Mexican Studies, UC San Diego.
- May 2008 Workshop on Endogenous Institutions and Political Conflict. Center on Institutions and Governance, UC Berkeley.
- December 2007 Research Seminar. CDDRL, Stanford University.
- October 2007 All-UC Group in Economic History, Graduate Student Workshop, Berkeley, California.
- March 2007 Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations. Osaka University, Japan.
- August 2006 2nd. Lindau Meeting in Economic Sciences. Lindau, Germany.

RESEARCH PAPERS AND PUBLICATIONS

- 2009 “Who built colonial institutions? The role of indigenous institutions in European colonialism,” joint with Desha Girod. Working paper.

Variation in colonial institutions appears to explain differences in political and economic development across former colonies. However, the origins of colonial institutions and the mechanisms through which institutions persist are not well understood. We study the role of pre-colonial institutions in early colonial institution building in the Americas. Our historical analysis suggests that pre-colonial institutions offering political and economic structures of control influenced the settlement and extractive strategies of Europeans. Using existing cross-country data, we find suggestive results: pre-colonial institutions explain more of the variation in current institutions than existing explanations. Existing data is inadequate to test our theory, however, because it fails to measure colonial institutions at settlement or sub-national variation. We are therefore collecting original data on labor and tribute institutions from the pre-colonial and colonial periods for the 444 sub-national states in the Americas. This paper describes our preliminary findings, ongoing data collection, and methodological approach.

- 2009 “Analytic Narratives.” Entry for the IPSA Encyclopedia, forthcoming 2010.

- 2008 “A theory of the origins of coercive enforcement: The provision of public goods in Colonial Mexico,” (submitted to JLEO).

A state with a coercive administration to enforce revenue collection underlies most economic analysis of the provision of public goods. Historically, however, rulers have obtained revenues without centralized fiscal administrations. I study the mechanisms used by the Spanish Crown to enforce revenue collection in Colonial Mexico and find that rulers face a trade-off between administrative cost-efficiency and the provision of public goods. Instead of investing in a coercive administration, rulers can target public goods and obtain revenue in exchange from the benefited groups. I also provide a game-theoretic framework to analyze the institutional change in Colonial Mexico to a coercive fiscal administration and the formation of a standing army. The results show that a transition can ensue when the cost due to free-riding of not providing a non-targetable public good—a standing army—becomes sufficiently large for both the ruler and the powerful groups. The powerful groups consent to an increase in the “grabbing” hand of the state as a commitment device to overcome free riding and ensure survival.

- 2007 “Can legitimacy lead to the concentration of coercive power?” Working paper.

UNIVERSITY AND SOCIAL SERVICE

- 2003–2004 Mentored undergraduate and graduate students, Department of Economics.
- 2003–2005 Mexicanos at Stanford, Mexican Student Association. Cultural Activities Committee.

UNIVERSITY AND SOCIAL SERVICE (continued)

2005–2008 Volunteer, Stanford Hospital.

OTHER

Software: Knowledge of STATA, MATLAB and LaTeX.

Languages: Fluent in English and Spanish.

REFERENCES

Prof. Avner Greif (Primary Advisor)
Department of Economics, Stanford University
Phone: (650)725-8936
avner@stanford.edu

Prof. B. Douglas Bernheim (Primary Advisor)
Department of Economics, Stanford University
Phone: (650)725-8732
bernheim@stanford.edu

Prof. Alberto Díaz-Cayeros
Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UC, San Diego
Phone: (858) 822-0056
adiazcayeros@ucsd.edu

Prof. Stephen Haber
Department of Political Science, Stanford University
Phone: (650)723-1466
haber@stanford.edu