

J. AISLINN BOHREN

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

<u>Placement Officer:</u>	Julie Cullen	(858) 822-2056	jbcullen@ucsd.edu
<u>Placement Assistant:</u>	Rebecca Franco	(858) 534-1867	refranco@ucsd.edu
<u>Placement Assistant:</u>	Suzi Harlow	(858) 822-3502	sharlow@ucsd.edu

OFFICE ADDRESS:

Department of Economics, 0508
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508

Phone (cell) : (908) 432-7889
Email : abohren@ucsd.edu
Website : <http://econ.ucsd.edu/~abohren/>

DATE OF BIRTH: 5/2/1982

SEX: Female

CITIZENSHIP: United States, Bermuda

GRADUATE STUDIES:

Ph.D., Economics, University of California, San Diego

DATES: August 2006 - Present

THESIS TITLE: Information and Incentives in Stochastic Games, Social Learning, and Crowd-Sourcing

EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE: May 2012

REFERENCES:

S. Nageeb Ali (Chair)	Joel Sobel	Joel Watson	Craig McIntosh
Department of Economics	Department of Economics	Department of Economics	School of International
UC San Diego	UC San Diego	UC San Diego	Relations and Pacific Studies
9500 Gilman Drive	9500 Gilman Drive	9500 Gilman Drive	UC San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508	La Jolla, CA 92093-0508	La Jolla, CA 92093-0508	9500 Gilman Drive
(858) 534-8250	(858) 534-4367	(858) 534-3384	La Jolla, CA 92093-0519
snail@ucsd.edu	jsobel@ucsd.edu	jwatson@ucsd.edu	(858) 534-1125
			ctmcintosh@ucsd.edu

DESIRED RESEARCH AND TEACHING:

Primary Fields: Game Theory, Microeconomic Theory

Secondary Fields: Political Economy, Social Networks

UNDERGRADUATE STUDIES:

B.S., *magna cum laude* with Honors in Economics, University of Richmond, 2004

MAJORS: Mathematics, Economics

MINORS: Computer Science, Studio Art

JOB MARKET PAPER:

“Stochastic Games in Continuous Time: Persistent Actions in Long-Run Relationships”

In many instances, a long-run player is influenced not only by considerations of its future but also by decisions it has made in the past. This paper studies a new class of stochastic games in which the actions of a long-run player have a persistent effect on payoffs. The setting is one of imperfect monitoring between a long-run and a short-run player. The main result of this paper is to establish general conditions for the existence of Markovian equilibria and conditions for the uniqueness of a Markovian equilibrium in the class of all Perfect Public Equilibria. The existence proof is constructive and characterizes, for any discount rate, the explicit form of equilibrium payoffs, continuation values, and actions in Markovian equilibria as a solution to a second order ODE. Action persistence creates a channel to provide intertemporal incentives, and offers a new and different framework for thinking about the reputations of firms, governments, and other long-run agents.

WORKING PAPERS:

“Information-Processing Bias in Social Learning” *March 2010*

Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Economic Theory

This paper explores how individuals learn from their predecessors when they are subject to biased beliefs about the information processing capabilities of others. I consider a social learning environment in which individuals observe private signals, and learning is asymptotically efficient in the absence of information processing biases. When individuals underestimate others' information processing capabilities, herds are less fragile and incorrect herds may persist forever. On the other hand, when individuals overestimate others' information processing, correct herds may break infinitely often, causing beliefs to perpetually fluctuate. When beliefs about others are approximately correct, learning is complete, so the model with no information-processing bias is robust to slight perturbations of beliefs.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:

“Information Aggregation in Search Committees” *with S. Nageeb Ali*

This paper examines how information is aggregated by a committee that has to decide when to end search. Each period, committee members observe private signals about the current alternatives, then vote whether to accept one of these alternatives or continue searching. In a pure common values setting, we extend the result of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) to this dynamic environment: the only voting rule that induces an equilibrium in which members vote informatively based on their private signals is the voting rule that corresponds to the optimal cut-off rule used by a social planner who observes everyone's private information. This voting rule is uniquely efficient when committee members have homogenous preferences.

“Incentives in Crowdsourcing” *with Troy Kravitz*

Crowdsourcing is the process of delegating tasks to an undefined group of prospective workers via an open call. A firm seeks to acquire information about the unknown state of the world for each task by employing workers to obtain costly signals. Incentive issues arise due to the one-shot nature of the relationship between workers and firms, further complicated by workers' preferences being independent of the state and unverifiable signal acquisition. This paper examines employment contracts in a crowdsourcing environment where costly monitoring is necessary to ensure workers exert effort. We characterize the set of feasible contracts and derive the optimal contract for the firm as a function of environmental conditions. The mechanisms we describe are tractable and offer improvements over those currently in use.

“Designing Experiments to Measure Spillover Effects” *with Sarah Baird, Craig McIntosh and Berk Ozler*

This paper develops the technique of experiments designed specifically to capture the nature and intensity of spillover effects between subjects. By first randomizing the intensity of treatment within each cluster and then randomizing individual treatment conditional on this cluster-level intensity, a novel set of research questions can be addressed. Not only do we gain direct evidence as the impact of the treatment on untreated units, but the experimental variation in the treatment intensity allows the researcher a straightforward way to observe saturation and threshold effects among treated and untreated units alike. We present a framework in which to back out a very rich set of parameters in the analysis of such an experiment, and examine the power implications of the randomized saturation design relative to more standard designs. We demonstrate that the randomization of saturations at the village level brings empirical benefits even when we are interested in spillovers in dimensions other than the one in the saturations were directly randomized. The technique is implemented using a Cash Transfer program in Malawi; we find evidence of beneficial spillovers that improve cognitive performance among untreated girls, and expenditures on girls prove very sensitive to the saturation of treatment at the village level. Social and household networks appear to be particularly strong conduits for beneficial spillover effects that improve school enrollment and decrease the risk of HIV/AIDS.

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND FELLOWSHIPS:

UCSD Clive Granger Research Fellowship, 2011

Yahoo! Key Scientific Challenges Winner, 2011

Humane Studies Fellowship, Institute for Humane Studies, 2010-2011

Walter P. Heller Memorial Award for Outstanding Third Year Paper, UC San Diego, Fall 2009

Teaching Assistance Excellence Award for Graduate Courses, UC San Diego, Fall 2008

Summer Graduate Research Fellowship, UC San Diego, Summer 2008

Herman P. Thomas Scholarship in Economics Recipient, U. Richmond, 2002 – 2004

University Scholar Scholarship Recipient, U. Richmond, 2000 – 2004

Golden Key International Honor Society, U. Richmond

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS \ SEMINARS:

2010 – 2011: North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society
2009 – 2010: Mini-Conference on Dynamic Contracts, UC San Diego

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

Teaching Assistant, UC San Diego, *Winter 2007 – Spring 2009 and Spring 2011*

- Graduate core microeconomics sequence (full year)
- Undergraduate game theory, microeconomics, econometrics, and finance courses

Qualifying Exam Tutor, UC San Diego, *Spring 2008*

- Taught weekly review sessions to prepare first year graduate class for microeconomics qualifying exam

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

Journal referee: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, Review of Economic Studies

University Service: Graduate Program Committee, Department of Economics, UCSD, 2008 – 2009

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD:

Research Assistant, Center for Research on Educational Equity, Assessment, and Teaching Excellence (CREATE) University of California, San Diego, *2008 - present*

- Research and evaluate programs aimed at expanding educational opportunities for underrepresented students, and closing the achievement gap among students from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds

Research Assistant, Professors Nageeb Ali and David Miller, *Spring 2008 and Fall 2009*

- Conducted analysis for a variety of projects related to cooperation in networks, multilateral bargaining and sequential voting

Research Assistant, Professor Paul Niehaus, *Feb 2010 and Mar 2011*

- Reviewed theoretical models of several social learning papers